No  New  Breaches:  Adding a Section to the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act to Alleviate the Pain Caused by K.D. v. Chambers by Bullock Green, Ashley
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 49 
Number 3 Spring 2015 pp.955-995 
Spring 2015 
No "New" Breaches: Adding a Section to the Indiana Medical 
Malpractice Act to Alleviate the Pain Caused by K.D. v. Chambers 
Ashley Bullock Green 
ashley.bullock@valpo.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ashley Bullock Green, No "New" Breaches: Adding a Section to the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act to 
Alleviate the Pain Caused by K.D. v. Chambers, 49 Val. U. L. Rev. 955 (2015). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss3/14 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University 
Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a 
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 
 955
NO “NEW” BREACHES:  ADDING A SECTION 
TO THE INDIANA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
ACT TO ALLEVIATE THE PAIN CAUSED BY 
K.D. V. CHAMBERS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Fitz visits Green Medical Center with stomach pain.1  The physician 
on duty, Dr. Huck, determines that Fitz needs a quick outpatient 
procedure to remedy his ailment.  The procedure goes well, and Dr. 
Huck sends him home to recover.  Three days later, Fitz experiences 
excruciating stomach pain, and Dr. Huck advises him to go to 
Lynniebrook Hospital.  Within five hours of his arrival at the hospital, 
Dr. Syrus, a general surgeon, performs surgery on him.  The next day, 
Nurse Quinn monitors Fitz, charting his progress and her care of him.  
He is recovering well, and the hospital staff informs his wife that he will 
be released in a few days.  However, just a few hours later, Fitz’s 
condition changes drastically.  The on-call physician, Dr. Harrison, 
enters the room within three minutes of hearing the emergency code 
being called, and Dr. Harrison and Nurse Quinn attempt to resuscitate 
Fitz.  Thirty minutes later, he is declared dead. 
Fitz’s wife hires Olivia, a local attorney, to file suit.  Complying with 
the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, Olivia first files a proposed 
complaint on behalf of Fitz’s estate and his wife with the Indiana 
Department of Insurance and serves all parties.2  The list of defendants is 
complex.  She sues Green Medical Center and its employee, Dr. Huck, 
Lynniebrook Hospital and employees Dr. Harrison and Nurse Quinn, 
and IND Medial Group and its employee Dr. Syrus.  The parties begin 
discovery, and submit evidence to the medical review panel (“Panel”) to 
support their arguments that the medical providers did or did not breach 
the applicable standard of care in their treatment of Fitz.3  The Panel 
determines Dr. Huck (which includes Green Medical Center) and Dr. 
Syrus (which includes IND Medical Group) breached the standard of 
care.  However, it finds that Lynniebrook Hospital and its employees did 
not breach the standard of care.  Now, a trial court gains jurisdiction over 
the case, and it proceeds like any other civil suit.4 
                                                 
1 The hypothetical scenario is fictional and is the sole creation of the author. 
2 See infra notes 43–46 and accompanying text (reviewing the procedure to commence a 
medical malpractice lawsuit in Indiana). 
3 See infra notes 57–63 and accompanying text (explaining the requirements for a Panel 
submission and the acceptable forms of evidence that the parties may submit to the Panel). 
4 See infra notes 69–71 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory requirements 
for a trial court to gain jurisdiction in a medical malpractice case). 
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Two weeks later, Lynniebrook Hospital files a motion for summary 
judgment, arguing that the court should grant its motion because the 
Panel did not find that the hospital or its employees breached the 
standard of care, therefore no claim exists for which relief may be 
granted.5  Olivia wants to keep the hospital in the suit, but knows that 
she does not have a strong case against Lynniebrook.  Along with the 
unfavorable Panel opinion, the notes in Fitz’s medical chart do not yield 
any damaging evidence against the hospital.  At this point, Olivia’s 
argument to maintain a cause of action against the hospital will not 
likely prevail.6 
The next day, Olivia receives a call from Dr. Huck’s counsel, who 
informs her that Lynniebrook Hospital was at fault for Fitz’s death.  The 
attorney could not provide any more details, so Olivia scrambles to 
validate this claim.  The only individual who was unavailable during 
discovery, prior to the Panel review meeting, was Nurse Quinn.  With 
high hopes that the nurse might be able to provide more information, 
Olivia hires a private investigator to locate Nurse Quinn. 
Nurse Quinn’s deposition turns out to be a game-changer for the 
case.  The nurse admits that she was fired from Lynniebrook, and says 
that she will no longer lie for the hospital.  She explains that it is 
common practice at Lynniebrook to “leave things out of charts that 
might be problematic,” such as changing a patient’s medicine dosage 
without authorization by a doctor, or charting that a nurse did 
something when it was really an aide.  Nurse Quinn says she remembers 
caring for Fitz and knows she was not in the room when his vital signs 
deteriorated.  However, she came in as soon as an aide yelled for her so 
she charted that she had been in the room to avoid anyone questioning 
the aide.  The nurse began to cry, and regrettably testified “that aide 
could have done anything to the patient.  When I walked in, he had a 
syringe in his hand.  That’s probably why that poor man is dead!” 
Now, Olivia has to find a way to keep Lynniebrook Hospital in the 
suit.  With this new evidence, she will be able to prove that the hospital, 
through its employees, committed a breach in the standard of care.7  
                                                 
5 See infra notes 62–68 and accompanying text (reviewing the four opinions available to 
the Panel when it determines what constitutes a breach of the applicable standard of care 
and the implications of a positive or negative opinion by the Panel for each health care 
provider). 
6 See infra note 68 and accompanying text (explaining that an unfavorable opinion from 
the Panel is not a complete bar to recovery, but is often grounds for a defendant health care 
provider to file a motion for summary judgment). 
7 See infra note 63 and accompanying text (reviewing the Act’s requirement that the 
Panel must determine whether each health care provider breached the applicable standard 
of care). 
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Olivia asks the judge to deny the hospital’s motion for summary 
judgment based on this new evidence.  The hospital cites a recent case 
and argues that the evidence is inadmissible because this issue was never 
presented to the Panel.8  The judge researches the law, and it is clear—
evidence not presented to and reviewed by a Panel is inadmissible.9  
With no authority to remand the case to the Panel for further review, the 
judge has no choice but to grant summary judgment for the hospital.10 
This Note proposes an additional statutory section to chapter ten, the 
Panel chapter, of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, to ensure that 
parties have a fair chance to present every viable theory of recovery to a 
court.11  If a new theory comes to light after a Panel renders an opinion, 
judges should have the discretionary authority to remand the case to the 
Panel for further review, or to permit the parties to proceed without 
further review by the Panel.12  With this authority, unjust situations, such 
as the hypothetical just presented, are preventable.13 
First, Part II of this Note describes the Indiana Medical Malpractice 
Act’s purpose and reasons for enactment by the Indiana General 
Assembly, with an emphasis on the Panel provisions.14  This Part also 
explains how malpractice claims work through the Panel process, 
discusses case law concerning the Panel, and considers the relevant 
evidentiary and trial rules that govern the trial court.15  Next, Part III 
analyzes the prerequisite Panel requirement with Miller v. Memorial 
Hospital of South Bend and K.D. v. Chambers as precedent, how judicial 
discretion might be used to alleviate the implications of conflicting case 
                                                 
8 See infra note 86 and accompanying text (presenting the holding from the recent case 
from the Indiana Court of Appeals, K.D. v. Chambers, where the court held that evidence 
not submitted to a Panel is inadmissible at trial). 
9 See id. (discussing the court’s holding in K.D. v. Chambers). 
10 See infra notes 130–34 and accompanying text (exploring the implications of the K.D. v. 
Chambers holding). 
11 See infra Part IV (proposing an additional section to include in the Panel chapter of the 
Act, which focuses primarily on judicial discretion when evidence of an additional breach 
in the applicable standard of care is discovered after a Panel renders an opinion). 
12 See id. (arguing for the benefits of this judicial authority and discussing its possible 
implications to the overall process of medical malpractice claims). 
13 See infra notes 204–09 and accompanying text (resolving the hypothetical with the 
proposed section to chapter ten of the Act). 
14 See infra Part II (exploring the history of the Act, including an Indiana governor’s call 
for legislative reform, and an overview of how medical malpractice claims work in Indiana, 
highlighting the Panel process). 
15 See id. (explaining how a medical malpractice case works through the Panel process, 
case law addressing the Panel requirement focusing primarily on Miller v. Memorial Hospital 
of South Bend and K.D. v. Chambers, and relevant evidentiary and trial rules). 
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law, and whether the courts or legislature should provide a remedy.16  
Finally, Part IV proposes an additional section that the Indiana General 
Assembly should include in the Panel chapter to remedy the unfortunate 
result of K.D. v. Chambers, and discusses the advantages and possible 
implications of the proposed section’s enactment.17  The proposed 
section grants trial judges the authority to remand cases to a Panel for 
further review when parties discover evidence of an additional breach 
after the Panel process.18 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The Panel requirement of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act 
(“Act”), in certain circumstances, has become more problematic than 
imaginable at its creation.19  Indiana was among the first states to 
address growing concerns about medical malpractice claims, in part by 
introducing a prerequisite Panel requirement.20  Before focusing on the 
prescreening Panel process, Part II.A briefly discusses the history of the 
Act, including the purpose for its creation and the Act’s three main 
components.21  Second, Part II.B explains how a Panel is formed, the 
composition of a Panel, how a medical malpractice claim moves through 
the Panel process, and duties of medical malpractice attorneys, parties, 
panelists, and trial courts that will gain jurisdiction of the suit after the 
Panel process.22  Next, Part II.C explores Indiana case law that addresses 
the Panel requirement, including two conflicting decisions from the 
                                                 
16 See infra Part III (analyzing the implications and inconsistencies of Miller v. Memorial 
Hospital of South Bend and K.D. v. Chambers, the discretion of trial judges, and how already-
available trial rules are used in the Panel process). 
17 See infra Part IV (proposing a statute to add to the Panel chapter of the Act, providing 
support and reasoning for the proposed statute, and addressing the arguments against its 
inclusion). 
18 See infra Part IV.B (explaining how the proposed statute can be used as a tool to 
medical malpractice plaintiffs in order to fully adjudicate their claims based on all available 
evidence that K.D. v. Chambers excludes). 
19 See infra Part II.A (reviewing the purposes for the Act’s creation, such as rising health 
care costs and medical malpractice insurance, the Act’s goals, and generally how a claim 
works its way through the process, from the time a plaintiff files a proposed complaint, 
through the Panel process, and up until the trial court gains jurisdiction of the case). 
20 See infra notes 30–33 (examining the concerns with medical malpractice claims in 
Indiana, such as some medical providers refusing to perform certain high risk procedures 
for fear of the patient later filing a lawsuit, and the three major reforms created by the Act). 
21 See id. (providing an overview of the reasons the Act was created and its three major 
components:  a comprehensive damage cap, the patient’s compensation fund, and the 
prerequisite Panel requirement). 
22 See infra Part II.B (explaining how a Panel is formed, the duties of the panelists and 
parties, the requirements to complete the Panel process, and the role of the trial court 
during the Panel process). 
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Indiana Supreme Court and Indiana Court of Appeals, Miller v. Memorial 
Hospital of South Bend and K.D. v. Chambers.23  Last, Part II.D explains the 
trial rules relevant to the Panel process, as well as the role of trial judges, 
including judicial discretion to determine evidentiary issues that arise 
after a Panel renders an opinion.24 
A. The Enactment of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act 
Early in 1975, Indiana was facing a growing health care crisis.25  The 
price of medical malpractice insurance was quickly rising, in sync with 
the number of malpractice claims being filed.26  It was becoming 
increasingly more difficult for health care providers to obtain 
malpractice insurance; the insurance companies stopped providing this 
type of coverage in Indiana, and this situation even caused the medical 
providers to stop performing certain medical procedures for fear of 
litigation.27  Indiana Governor Otis R. Bowen, a medical doctor, called for 
reform of the tort system for medical malpractice claims.28  Governor 
                                                 
23 See infra Part II.C (discussing Miller v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend and K.D. v. 
Chambers). 
24 See infra Part II.D (explaining several relevant evidentiary and trial rules that are used 
during the Panel process and the role of the trial court during and after the process). 
25 See Bruce D. Jones, Note, Unfair and Harsh Results of Contributory Negligence Lives in 
Indiana:  The Indiana Medical Malpractice System and the Indiana Comparative Fault Act, 6 IND. 
HEALTH L. REV. 107, 108 (2009) (stating the Act was passed “in response to the growing 
health care crisis the state was facing”). 
26 See infra note 28 and accompanying text (providing excerpts from Governor Bowen’s 
speech to the General Assembly, where he called for legislative reform of the health care 
delivery system); see also Scott A. DeVries, Note, Medical Malpractice Acts’ Statutes of 
Limitation as They Apply to Minors:  Are They Proper?, 28 IND. L. REV. 413, 416 (1995) (“The 
number of claims filed, the average amount awarded, and malpractice insurance premiums 
rose significantly between 1970 and 1975.”). 
27 See DeVries, supra note 26, at 416 (providing three basic assumptions under which 
medical malpractice laws, including Indiana’s, were passed in the 1970s).  Devries states: 
Medical malpractice statutes were passed based upon assumptions 
that:  (1) increased insurance premiums created a lack of available 
affordable liability insurance; (2) there is a close nexus between 
substantive tort law, the tort litigation process and the insurance 
industry's decisions regarding the availability and the price of such 
insurance; and (3) placing restrictions on the tort liability system will 
effectuate a reduction in insurance premiums resulting in an increase 
in reasonably priced insurance. 
Id.; see also infra note 28 and accompanying text (providing excerpts from Governor 
Bowen’s speech to the General Assembly, where he called for legislative reform of the 
Indiana health care delivery system). 
28 GOVERNOR OTIS R. BOWEN, MESSAGE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, STATE OF INDIANA, 
JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE 31, 35–36 (Jan. 9, 1975).  The message includes: 
Recently the attention of all Hoosiers has been drawn to a problem of 
growing severity which threatens Indiana’s health care delivery 
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Bowen addressed the Indiana General Assembly, stating, “[t]he solution 
to this growing health care crisis is not an easy one . . . and it certainly 
will not be gained without a great deal of debate and controversy.”29  In 
April of that same year, the General Assembly responded by enacting 
the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act.30  Indiana was among the first 
states to institute tort reform through a legislative solution to address the 
increasing costs of malpractice liability insurance.31  The Act’s 
                                                                                                             
system. . . .  The problem—the eroding effect that the shrinking 
availability of reasonable medical malpractice insurance is having 
upon the quality of and accessibility to proper medical care.  The 
traditional procedures of medical malpractice settlement and 
frequency of malpractice litigation have driven a number of insurance 
carriers completely out of the business of writing this coverage.  This 
lack of reasonably available medical malpractice insurance coverage is 
forcing doctors to opt out of certain types of operations or medical 
specialties due to their high legal risk. . . .  These factors also combine 
to drive up the cost of medical care to the patient because the increased 
threat of potential legal exposure forces the physicians to practice 
“defensive medicine”—that which is carried out with one eye on the 
patient and one eye on the courts. . . .  The solution to this growing 
health care crisis is not an easy one . . . and it certainly will not be one 
gained without a great deal of debate and controversy.  There are, 
however, a number of potential ways by which this problem may be 
confronted, and I am certain that a number of proposals will be 
introduced before you in this session. . . . 
Id. at 35–36.  But see Garau Germano Hanley & Pennington, P.C., Indiana Medical Malpractice 
Lawyers Know “Defensive Medicine” is More Myth Than Fact, IND. MED. MALPRACTICE LAW. 
BLOG (Sept. 8, 2010), http://www.indianapolis-medical-malpractice-lawyer.com/blog/ 
2010/09/indiana-medical-malpractice-lawyers-know-defensive-medicine-is-more-myth-
than-fact.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc/FS8E-SKCU (citing a recent Health Affairs 
journal study, which “found that the costs of ‘defensive medicine’ have been dramatically 
overstated by critics of the malpractice system”). 
29 See supra note 28 (providing excerpts of Governor’s Bowen’s Address to the Indiana 
General Assembly). 
30 Act of Apr. 17, 1975, Pub. L. No. 146-1975, 1975 Ind. Acts 854 (codified as amended at 
IND. CODE §§ 27-12-1-1 to 18-2 (1975)).  See INDIANA STATE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, A 
HISTORY OF THE MEDICAL LIABILITY ISSUE, INDIANA COMPENSATION ACT FOR PATIENTS (May 
2003), available at http://www.ismanet.org/pdf/INCAP_White_Paper.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/EH2S-638C (describing the reasons for the Act’s enactment, and 
explaining that “[m]edical malpractice is not one problem, but a series of interrelated 
problems that involve the regulation and social control of medical practice, quality of care, 
insurance markets, consistent assessment of liability in the legal system and the existing 
paradigm of societal attitudes toward the practice of medicine”). 
31 See James D. Kemper et al., Reform Revisited:  A Review of the Indiana Medical Malpractice 
Act Ten Years Later, 19 IND. L. REV. 1129, 1129 (1986) (exploring the Indiana General 
Assembly’s purpose for enacting the Act); Eleanor D. Kinney, Indiana’s Medical Malpractice 
Reform Revisited:  A Limited Constitutional Challenge, 31 IND. L. REV. 1043, 1046 (1998) 
[hereinafter Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Reform Revisited] (explaining the Indiana General 
Assembly’s response to the growing health care crisis); Jones, supra note 25, at 108 (noting 
that Indiana was the first state to pass statutory reform through legislative measures). 
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overarching goal was to help health care providers maintain insurance 
coverage, and in turn, protect the public from decreased services.32  The 
Act’s three major components are:  (1) a comprehensive damage cap; (2) 
a patient’s compensation fund; and (3) a Panel requirement.33 
Currently, a patient’s award for damages may not exceed 
$1,250,000.34  Liable health care providers are responsible for the first 
$250,000, and the remaining amount of damages awarded is payable 
from the patient’s compensation fund.35  All qualified insured health care 
                                                 
32 See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing Governor Bowen’s call for tort 
reform); Kemper et al., supra note 31, at 1129 (explaining the Act’s purpose and the 
legislative response); see also Eleanor D. Kinney et al., Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act:  
Results of a Three Year Study, 24 IND. L. REV. 1275, 1277 (1991) [hereinafter Indiana’s Medical 
Malpractice Act:  Results of a Three Year Study] (discussing the Act’s purpose and stating that 
it was to “assure the continued availability of health care services in the state”). 
33 See IND. CODE § 34-18-14-3 (2014) (providing the maximum amount of damages 
recoverable under the Act); id. § 34-18-6-1 (creating the patient’s compensation fund); id. 
§ 34-18-10-1 (establishing “medical review panels to review proposed medical malpractice 
complaints against health care providers”); see also Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Reform 
Revisited, supra note 31, at 1046 (explaining the comprehensive damage cap, patient’s 
compensation fund, and the Panel requirement of the Act). 
34 See IND. CODE § 34-18-14-3(a)(3) (2014) (referring to acts of malpractice that occurred 
from July 1, 1999 to present).  Additionally, the Indiana General Assembly is currently 
considering a Senate Bill that will require all claims be paid every three months, instead of 
every six months.  S.B. 56, 118th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2014).  Over the past 
several years, the damage cap has increased.  See id. § 34-18-14-3(a)(2)–(3) (stating that acts 
of malpractice before January 1, 1990 were capped at $500,000, and acts before July 1, 1999 
at $750,000).  Further, the Indiana Department of Insurance (“IDOI”) maintains a website 
where anyone can search for any health care provider’s malpractice history.  See INDIANA 
PATIENT’S COMPENSATION FUND, http://www.indianapcf.com (last visited Mar. 5, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/8P4Y-NHB5 (last visited Mar. 5, 2015) (providing a search 
engine where users may search by provider or claim for more information on medical 
malpractice suits brought against health care providers in Indiana). 
35 See IND. CODE § 34-18-14-3(c) (2014) (“[a]ny amount due from a judgment or 
settlement that is in excess of the total liability of all liable health care providers . . . shall be 
paid from the patient’s compensation fund”).  Many plaintiffs have argued that the current 
damage cap leaves a large gap between the amount of loss suffered by the patient and the 
amount the plaintiff can be awarded in a successful medical malpractice case.  See Patients 
Blast Indiana Law That Protects Doctors:  Patient’s Family Fights Malpractice Act, INDY 
CHANNEL (May 20, 2011), http://www.theindychannel.com/lifestyle/health/patients-
blast-indiana-law-that-protects-doctors, archived at http://perma.cc/W5PB-LCX2 
(recounting a malpractice plaintiff’s unhappiness with the $250,000 damage cap for 
physicians, when the patient’s “medical expenses top $1.8 million and his lost income totals 
more than $4 million”); Marc Chase, Millions in Malpractice Claims to be Paid by State Fund, 
Not “Nose Doc”, HAMMOND COMM. NEWS (June 25, 2013, 7:15 PM), 
http://www.nwitimes.com/ news/local/lake/hammond/millions-in-malpractice-claims-
to-be-paid-by-state-fund/ article_8a37a7bf-e3c2-5408-a554-7ec4304ccdb9.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/DU4R-58KT (detailing the highly-publicized lawsuits against a former 
Merrillville, Indiana physician in which the patient’s compensation fund was used to settle 
approximately 300 suits totaling $66 million). 
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providers in the state are assessed an annual special surcharge, which is 
paid into the patient’s compensation fund, in order to cover damages 
awarded for malpractice.36 
The Panel requirement is a prerequisite to filing a medical 
malpractice suit against health care providers in Indiana.37  It serves as a 
tool to screen medical malpractice claims before they are filed in court, 
with one of its goals clearly designed to distinguish the meritorious 
claims from the frivolous.38  The Panel requirement is also meant to 
speed up the overall disposition of malpractice claims, and control costs 
for all parties by providing expert opinions early in the process.39  By 
design, the Panel provides parties with a quick, informal decision on 
liability before the claim may be filed in open court.40  Many critics note 
                                                 
36 See IND. CODE § 34-18-5-1 (2014) (“[t]o create a source of money for the patient’s 
compensation fund, an annual surcharge shall be levied on all health care providers in 
Indiana”); see also American Medical Association, State Patient Compensation Funds (Feb. 
2008), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/181171839/AMA-state-Patient-
Compensation-Funds#scribd, archived at http://perma.cc/2T4Q-CR2G (describing 
Indiana’s patient compensation fund by stating that it “is funded through annual 
surcharges assessed against all qualified health care providers”). 
37 See IND. CODE § 34-18-8-4 (2014) (providing that actions against health care providers 
cannot be commenced in an Indiana court before a proposed complaint is presented to a 
Panel and the Panel gives an opinion).  But see id. § 34-18-8-5 (noting that this prerequisite is 
not a complete mandate, as parties can agree to bypass the Panel review); id. § 34-18-8-6(a) 
(providing that claims for less than $15,000 do not have to be presented to a Panel). 
38 See Kemper et al., supra note 31, at 1129 (explaining the Indiana General Assembly’s 
purpose and goals for the Act’s creation); Sebastian Kitchen, Medical Review Panels Approved 
by Kentucky Senate Panel, COURIER-J. (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.courier-journal.com/ 
story/news/politics/ky-legislature/2014/02/12/medical-review-panels-approved-by-
kentucky-senate-panel/5424389/, archived at http://perma.cc/765P-FN62 (discussing the 
Kentucky Senate Panel’s recent vote to approve the use of medical review panels, with Dr. 
Glenn Loomis, CEO of St. Elizabeth Physicians, stating, “Indiana has used review panels 
for years to reduce malpractice claims”).  However, not everyone in Kentucky is 
welcoming of the proposed bill to enact a prerequisite Panel requirement similar to 
Indiana’s.  See Jan Scherrer, Jan Scherrer:  Bill for Medical Review Panel Blocks Our Access to 
Courts, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.kentucky.com/2014/ 
02/19/3096228_jan-scherrer-bill-for-medical.html?rh=1, archived at http://perma.cc/S3Y7-
4SSD (opposing the proposed medical malpractice reform in Kentucky that resembles 
Indiana law by asserting “Indiana is the only neighboring state that uses review panels, 
and Indiana’s nursing home care is abominable”). 
39 See Kemper et al., supra note 31, at 1129 (explaining the Indiana General Assembly’s 
purpose and goals for the Act’s creation); Catherine Schick Hurlbut, Note, Constitutionality 
of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act:  Re-Evaluated, 19 VAL. U. L. REV. 493, 494 (1985) 
(asserting that the legislative intent of the Panel process was to decrease delays in the 
disposition of medical malpractice claims). 
40 See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-20 (2014) (“[m]eetings shall be informal”); Kemper et al., 
supra note 31, at 1142 (“[t]he opinion of the panel is no more than an opinion”); id. at 1133, 
1141 (discussing that “[t]he panel is not bound by formalities,” and additionally, that the 
“[t]he entire panel process should take nine months” but that “reality is much different 
from the mechanism set out in the Act”). 
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that the reality of the Panel’s place in medical malpractice claims is much 
more.41  The Act’s statutory requirements for the Panel process impact 
attorneys, parties, panelists, and trial judges from the proposed 
complaint, through discovery, during trial, and even after a final 
judgment is entered and the decision is appealed.42 
B. A Walk Through the Panel Process 
Chapter ten of the Act sets out specific guidelines for the Panel 
process that parties must follow before a medical malpractice claim may 
be pursued in a trial court.43  First, a claimant files a proposed complaint 
with the Indiana Department of Insurance (“IDOI”) commissioner and 
serves all parties to be included in the suit.44  Next, the claimant requests 
the formation of a Panel, which will evaluate the plaintiff’s proposed 
complaint.45  All parties to the suit and the IDOI receive notice of this 
                                                 
41 See Kemper et al., supra note 31, at 1133 (“The nine-month statutory timetable is rarely, 
if ever, met.”); William A. Ramsey & Catherine Hart, DTCI:  The Medical Review Panel 
Process, IND. LAW. (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.theindianalawyer.com/dtci-the-medical-
review-panel-process/PARAMS/article/32336, archived at http://perma.cc/M3AZ-PF9H 
(“The medical review panel process plays an important role in medical malpractice 
litigation, including separating meritorious claims from meritless claims.”); How to File a 
Claim with a Medical Review Panel, BAKER & GILCHRIST, http://www.bakerand 
gilchrist.com/legal-services/medical-malpractice/medical-review-panel/ (last visited Mar. 
2, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/UHT2-HK3D  (explaining the Panel process for 
medical malpractice claims in Indiana, articulating “[t]he panel’s report is admissible as 
evidence in the case, and it could carry a great deal of weight with a jury” and “the 
selection of the medical review panel process is critical to the outcome of [a] claim”); Garau 
Germano Hanley & Pennington, P.C., Indiana Court of Appeals Affirms Medical Malpractice 
Verdict, IND. MED. MALPRACTICE L. BLOG (May 18, 2012), http://www.indianapolis-
medical-malpractice-lawyer.com/blog/2012/05/indiana-court-of-appeals-affirms-medical-
malpractice-verdict.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc/5CQ9-7NG9 (highlighting frequent 
problems with medical malpractice cases, such as when “panels ignore the limit on their 
power,” and further stating that “when the physicians on the medical review panel 
overstep their bounds by resolving conflicts in the evidence, they almost always resolve 
them in favor of their fellow physicians”). 
42 See infra Part II.B (explaining the step-by-step process required under chapter ten of 
the Act and the roles of medical malpractice parties, attorneys, panelists, and trial judges). 
43 See infra notes 44–71 and accompanying text (reviewing the statutory requirements in 
chapter ten of the Act, focusing predominantly on the Panel process). 
44 See IND. CODE § 34-18-7-3(b) (2014) (clarifying that proposed complaints are 
“considered filed when a copy of the proposed complaint is delivered or mailed by 
registered or certified mail to the commissioner”); see also id. § 34-18-7-3(a) (“The filing of a 
proposed complaint tolls the applicable statute of limitations to and including a period of 
ninety (90) days following the receipt of the opinion of the medical review panel by the 
claimant.”). 
45 See id. § 34-18-10-2 (“[n]o earlier than twenty (20) days after the filing of a proposed 
complaint, either party may request the formation of a medical review panel”); Jones, supra 
note 25, at 113 (describing the Panel process, including the statutory requirement that 
parties may convene a Panel twenty days after filing a complaint). 
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action.46  Although each requirement of Panel selection includes a 
relatively short time restriction, given the numerous steps, the process of 
selecting a Panel should ideally span seventy to ninety days.47 
Each Panel includes one attorney and three health care providers.48  
The attorney acts as chairman of the Panel, serves in an advisory 
capacity, and does not vote.49  The chairman, using “his or her 
professional experience as an attorney,” is tasked with “advising the 
three medical professionals on the panel about the law.”50  The parties 
select the chairman, who expedites the selection of Panel members, 
convenes the Panel, may remove panelists, and oversees the Panel’s 
review of the proposed complaint and evidence submitted by the 
parties.51 
                                                 
46 See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-2 (2014) (explaining that the party requesting the Panel must 
do so “by serving a request by registered or certified mail upon all parties and the 
commissioner”). 
47 See Hurlbut, supra note 39, at 497 (“[T]he selection process encompasses seventy to 
ninety days from the request for a formation.”).  More information on the Panel process is 
available on the IDOI website.  See Medical Malpractice, IND. DEPT. OF INS., 
http://www.in.gov/idoi/2614.htm#1 (last visited Mar. 5, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/4H6B-NF77 (providing consumer information for medical malpractice 
complaints, such as the filing procedure and attorney referrals). 
48 See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-3 (2014) (“A medical review panel consists of one (1) attorney 
and three (3) health care providers.”); Hurlbut, supra note 39, at 496 (stating that Panels 
consist of three health care providers and one attorney). 
49 See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-3 (2014) (“The attorney member of the medical review panel 
shall act as the chairman of the panel and in an advisory capacity but may not vote.”); see 
also Hurlbut, supra note 39, at 496–97 (explaining that the chairman “sits in an advisory 
capacity” and “has no vote in the [P]anel’s decision”). 
50 See Sherrow v. GYN, Ltd., 745 N.E.2d 880, 884 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (discussing a 
chairman’s role in advising panelists of the validity of legal arguments raised by parties in 
panel submissions); IND. CODE § 34-18-10-16(a) (2014) (“The chairman may remove a 
member of the panel if the chairman decides that the member is not fulfilling the duties 
imposed upon the panel members by this chapter.”); id. § 34-18-10-17(d) (“The chairman 
shall ensure that before the panel gives its expert opinion . . . each panel member has the 
opportunity to review every item of evidence submitted by the parties.”). 
51 See supra note 50 and accompanying text (explaining that the attorney member serves 
in an advisory capacity); IND. CODE § 34-18-10-4 (2014) (providing the process for selecting 
a Panel).  The process is as follows: 
A medical review panel shall be selected in the following manner:  (1) 
Within fifteen (15) days after the filing of a request for formation of a 
medical review panel . . . the parties shall select a panel chairman by 
agreement.  If no agreement on a panel chairman can be reached, 
either party may request the clerk of the supreme court to draw at 
random a list of five (5) names of attorneys who:  (A) are qualified to 
practice; (B) are presently on the rolls of the supreme court; and (C) 
maintain offices in the county of venue designated in the proposed 
complaint or in a contiguous county.  (2) Before selecting the random 
list, the clerk shall collect a twenty-five dollar ($25) medical review 
panel selection fee from the party making the request for the formation 
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All health care providers licensed in Indiana are eligible for selection 
to serve as members of a Panel.52  Each party (or one party per side) 
selects one health care provider within fifteen days of the chairman 
selection, and those two providers select the third panelist.53  If a 
defendant health care provider is a specialist, at least one of the panelists 
must specialize in the same area.54  Panelists are paid a fee for 
participating in the process, as well as travel expenses.55  The side whose 
favor the majority opinion is written is responsible for payment, or the 
                                                                                                             
of the random list.  (3) The clerk shall notify the parties, and the parties 
shall then strike names alternatively with the plaintiff striking first 
until one (1) name remains. . . .  (5) If a party does not strike a name 
within five (5) days after receiving notice from the clerk:  (A) the 
opposing party shall, in writing, request the clerk to strike for the 
party; and (B) the clerk shall strike for that party. 
Id. 
52 Id. § 34-18-10-5.  There are many cases addressing which health care providers fall 
within the statutory definition and how this is to be determined.  See, e.g., Harlett v. St. 
Vincent Hosps. & Health Svcs., 748 N.E.2d 921, 925 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (reversing the trial 
court’s determination that registered or licensed practical nurses were not health care 
providers under the Act); Guinn v. Light, 536 N.E.2d 546, 546 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) 
(clarifying that the Panel “can act only if the health care provider before it is ‘qualified’ 
under the Act”); Michael W. Hoskins, Court Clarifies Ruling on Medical Review Panel Process, 
IND. LAW. (July 8, 2011), http://www.theindianalawyer.com/court-clarifies-ruling-on-
medical-review-panel-process/PARAMS/article/26723, archived at http://perma.cc/7V9R-
CDY3 (evaluating the Honore case and determining that “[r]egistered nurses or licensed 
practical nurses are included in the statutory definition of health care providers”). 
53 See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-6 (2014) (“Each party to the action has the right to select one 
(1) health care provider, and upon selection, the two (2) health care providers thus selected 
shall select the third panelist.”); id. § 34-18-10-7 (“[if] there are multiple plaintiffs or 
defendants, only one (1) health care provider shall be selected per side,” and “[t]he 
plaintiff . . . has the right to select one (1) health care provider and the defendant . . . has the 
right to select one (1) health care provider”). 
54 See id. § 34-18-10-8 (explaining that two of the panelists must be a member of the same 
profession as the defendant, and if the defendant’s area of practice is a specialty, two of the 
panelists must also specialize in the same area); see also Ryan M. Siedermann et al., Closing 
the Gate on Questionable Expert Witness Testimony:  A Proposal to Institute Expert Review 
Panels, 33 S.U. L. REV. 29, 79 (2005) (proposing a model rule for the creation of expert 
review panels in the future, which in part references language from Indiana’s Act, 
including “[t]he expert members of the panel must be selected from a pool of individuals 
qualified in the same specialty as the expert whose testimony or evidence is to be 
reviewed”). 
55 See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-25 (2014) (explaining that health care providers receive $350 
and reasonable travel expenses, the Panel chairman receives $250 per diem, with a limit set 
of $2000 and reasonable travel expenses); see also Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 
N.E.2d 585, 596 (Ind. 1980) (holding that the panelist compensation provision of the Act is 
constitutional due to the low amount of compensation required).  But see INDIANA’S 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACT:  RESULTS OF A THREE YEAR STUDY, supra note 32, at 1302 
(characterizing the Panel process as a “costly” proceeding). 
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chairman may decide to divide the cost if the Panel does not render a 
uniform or unanimous opinion.56 
Next, the parties begin discovery and must promptly submit written 
evidence for the Panel’s consideration.57  Evidence may consist of:  
medical charts, x-rays, lab tests, excerpts from treatises, depositions of 
witnesses including the parties, and any other form allowable by the 
panel.58  Before considering any evidence, the panelists must take an 
oath to perform to the best of their ability.59  By statute, the Panel should 
render its expert opinion within 180 days of the selection of the last 
member.60  However, there are commonly used exceptions to this rule, 
which can heavily impact the length of time before a Panel actually 
renders an opinion.61 
                                                 
56 See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-25(d) (2014) (“Fees of the panel, including travel expenses 
and other expenses of the review, shall be paid by the side whose favor the majority 
opinion is written[,]” and “[i]f there is no majority opinion, each side shall pay fifty percent 
(50%) of the cost.”). 
57 See id. § 34-18-10-17(a) (“[E]vidence in written form to be considered by the medical 
review panel shall be promptly submitted by the respective parties.”); see also Sherrow v. 
GYN, Ltd., 745 N.E.2d 880, 884 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“[P]arties are permitted to submit 
evidence to the panel.”). 
58 See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-17(b) (2014) (explaining the permissible forms of evidence 
that may be submitted to the Panel for review); see also Sherrow, 745 N.E.2d at 884–85 
(determining that panelists “may consult with other medical authorities and reports by 
other health care providers); Kranda v. Houser-Norberg Med. Corp., 419 N.E.2d 1024, 
1032–33 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (explaining that this provision should not be so narrowly 
construed to determine that panelists may only consult the medical authorities outlined in 
the provision). 
59 See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-17(e) (2014) (supplying the suggested oath or affirmation to 
be recited by the panelists).  The oath states: 
I (swear) (affirm) under penalties of perjury that I will well and truly 
consider the evidence submitted by the parties; that I will render my 
opinion without bias, based upon the evidence submitted by the 
parties, and that I have not and will not communicate with any party 
or representative of a party before rendering my opinion, except as 
authorized by law. 
Id.; see also Tucker v. Harrison, 973 N.E.2d 46, 54–55 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (discussing that 
the oath also includes rendering an “opinion without bias” and holding that all health care 
providers are not generally biased merely because they have a financial interest in the 
patient’s compensation fund). 
60 See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-13(a) (2014) (providing the time for issuance of an opinion by 
the Panel); Stephen L. Williams, Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act—The Developing Law—, 
RES GESTAE 494, 497 (Apr. 1984) (“One of the most important time limits within the Act is 
that the panel must render its written opinion within 180 days after the last panel member 
is selected.”). 
61 See Beemer v. Elskens, 677 N.E.2d 1117, 1119 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (explaining that if an 
opinion is not rendered within the requisite time frame, the panel must provide an 
explanation for the delay and attempt to move the process forward in a reasonable 
manner); Gleason v. Bush, 664 N.E.2d 1183, 1185 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that if a 
panel is unable to comply with the requisite time frame, sanctions are not automatically 
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Within thirty days of reviewing all evidence, the Panel renders its 
opinion in writing.62  The Panel’s sole duty is to give an expert opinion as 
to whether the evidence supports a conclusion that the defendant(s) 
acted or failed to act within the appropriate standard of care as charged 
in the proposed complaint.63  Under the statutory time limitations set out 
in the Act, the entire Panel process should be complete approximately 
nine months after the filing of a proposed complaint.64 
                                                                                                             
triggered); Lester F. Murphy, Pitfalls in Medical Malpractice Panel Practice, RES GESTAE 178, 
180 (Oct. 1985) (discussing the difficulty of meeting this deadline because of delays due to 
scheduling conflicts and geographical location of the panelists); Hurlbut, supra note 39, at 
500–01 (concluding that “few claims receive a review panel decision within the nine month 
prescribed limitation”). 
62 See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-22 (2014); see also Murphy, supra note 61, at 180 (“The panel 
normally reaches its opinion the same night that it convenes”).  However, the statutory 
time limitation is rarely met.  See Hurlbut, supra note 39, at 500–01 (concluding that few 
claims meet the statutory time limitations).  One study found that the average timeframe 
from the time a proposed complaint was filed and the Panel rendering an opinion was 
thirty-two months.  See Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act:  Results of a Three Year Study, supra 
note 32, at 1296 (reporting results from a study based on evidence collected from 1975 
through 1988). 
63 IND. CODE § 34-18-10-22(b (2014).  The available opinions are whether: 
(1) The evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant or 
defendants failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care as 
charged in the complaint; (2) The evidence does not support the 
conclusion that the defendant or defendants failed to comply with the 
appropriate standard of care as charged in the complaint; (3) There is a 
material issue of fact, not requiring expert opinion, bearing on liability 
for consideration by the court or jury; or (4) The conduct complained 
of was or was not a factor of the resultant damages.  If so, whether the 
plaintiff suffered:  (A) any disability and the extent and duration of the 
disability; and (B) any permanent impairment and the percentage of 
the impairment. 
Id.; see Bonnes v. Feldner, 642 N.E.2d 217, 219 (Ind. 1994) (“The panel has the sole duty to 
express its expert opinion or opinions as to whether or not the evidence supports the 
conclusion that the defendant acted or failed to act within the appropriate standard of care 
as charged in the complaint.”); Kranda v. Houser-Norborg Med. Corp., 419 N.E.2d 1024, 
1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that the panel’s “purpose is to conduct a rational inquiry 
into the extent and source of the patient’s injury for the purpose of forming its expert 
opinion”); Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act:  Results of a Three Year Study, supra note 32, at 
1279 (discussing the Panel’s duty); Hurlbut, supra note 39, at 498 (explaining that a Panel’s 
“sole duty is to determine the validity of the patient’s complaint against the defendant 
health care provider”). 
64 See Hurlbut, supra note 39, at 498 (totaling all time requirements of the Panel process, 
including ninety days for Panel selection and 180 days for the Panel to render its opinion).  
But see Mooney v. Anonymous M.D. 4, 991 N.E.2d 565, 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (“The Act 
anticipates that a panel might not always be able to meet the deadline.”).  See also IND. 
CODE § 34-18-10-13(b) (2014) (“If the panel has not given an opinion within the time 
allowed under subsection (a), the panel shall submit a report to the commissioner, stating 
the reasons for the delay.”); Beemer, 677 N.E.2d at 1120 (explaining that the Panel must 
submit an explanation for the delay and make a reasonable effort to expedite the process); 
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Although the Panel review is a statutory requirement, Panel 
decisions are admissible, but not binding, upon the court.65  
Additionally, panelists are immune from civil liability concerning their 
duties on a Panel.66  The Panel opinion is “not conclusive, and either 
party, at the party’s cost, has the right to call any member of the medical 
review panel as a witness.”67  Quite often, defendant health care 
providers that receive a unanimous Panel opinion will likely file a 
motion for summary judgment.68 
                                                                                                             
Gleason, 664 N.E.2d at 1187 (determining that if a Panel does not comply with the time 
requirements of the Act, sanctions are not automatically triggered, but it must explain the 
reason for delay and make a reasonable attempt to expedite the process). 
65 See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-23 (2014) (“A report of the expert opinion reached by the 
medical review panel is admissible as evidence in any action subsequently brought by the 
claimant in a court of law.”); see also Smith v. Dermatology Assocs. of Ft. Wayne, P.C., 977 
N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (discussing that the defendant health care provider 
admitted evidence of a favorable Panel opinion at trial). 
66 See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-24 (2014) (“A panelist has absolute immunity from civil 
liability for all communications, findings, opinions, and conclusions made in the course 
and scope of duties prescribed by this article.”); see also Siedermann, supra note 54, at 81 
(proposing a model rule for the creation of expert review panels in the future, which in part 
references language from Indiana’s Act, including “[a] panelist has absolute immunity 
from civil liability for all communications, findings, opinions, and conclusions made in the 
course and scope of duties . . . ”). 
67 See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-23 (2014) (discussing the admissibility of the Panel’s report at 
trial and the parties’ ability to call Panel members as witnesses); Haas v. Bush, 894 N.E.2d 
229, 235 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that Panelists must appear and testify if called by 
either party, and “any alleged frailties in the panel opinion [can be] exposed” by the trial 
judge); Dickey v. Long, 575 N.E.2d 339, 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that under no 
circumstances should the Panel’s report be determined inadmissible, because the trier of 
fact can judge the credibility and issues with the Panel at trial). 
68 See Smith, 977 N.E.2d at 5 (quoting Mills v. Berrios, 851 N.E.2d 1066, 1070 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2006)).  The court states: 
When a medical review panel issues an opinion in favor of the 
physician, the plaintiff must present expert medical testimony to 
negate the panel’s opinion.  If the plaintiff fails to provide sufficient 
expert testimony, summary judgment should be granted in favor of the 
defendants.  However, a medical malpractice case based upon 
negligence is rarely appropriate for disposal by summary judgment, 
particularly when the critical issue is whether the defendant exercised 
the appropriate standard of care under the circumstances.  This issue is 
generally inappropriate for resolution as a matter of law and is a 
question that should be reserved for the trier of fact. 
Id.; see also Mills, 851 N.E.2d at 1070 (“When a medical review panel issues an opinion in 
favor of the physician, the plaintiff must present expert medical testimony to negate the 
panel’s opinion.  If the plaintiff fails to provide sufficient expert testimony, summary 
judgment should be granted in favor of the defendants.” (citations omitted)). 
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Until the Panel issues an opinion, the trial court has no jurisdiction to 
hear and adjudicate the malpractice claim.69  This statute ensures that 
one of the Indiana General Assembly’s main goals for creating the Panel 
requirement, prescreening of proposed medical malpractice claims, is 
met.70  However, it has wide discretion to impose sanctions for failure to 
comply with the Act’s prerequisite Panel process.71  Next, case law 
interpreting the statutes concerning the Panel process and the additional 
rules created by the courts are discussed, with the primary focus on 
Miller v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend and K.D. v. Chambers.72 
C. Defining the Parameters of the Panel Requirement with Miller and 
Chambers 
The Act has been challenged on many grounds since it became law 
in 1975.73  The Indiana Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, 
upheld the constitutionality of the Act.74  Other challenges address the 
                                                 
69 See Griffith v. Jones, 602 N.E.2d 107, 111 (Ind. 1992) (discussing trial court’s lack of 
jurisdiction to instruct Panel concerning definitions of terms and phrases used in the Act); 
K.D. v. Chambers, 951 N.E.2d 855, 858 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that the trial court had 
no jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate the case until the Panel issues its opinion).  But see 
Harlett v. St. Vincent Hosps. & Health Svcs., 748 N.E.2d 921, 924 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) 
(determining that the trial court did have jurisdiction to make a preliminary determination 
of law concerning the formation of a panel). 
70 See supra Part II.A (discussing the Indiana General Assembly’s purpose for enacting a 
statute that requires medical malpractice prescreening Panels). 
71 See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-14 (2014) (“A party, attorney, or panelist who fails to act as 
required by this chapter without good cause shown is subject to mandate or appropriate 
sanctions upon application to the court designated in the proposed complaint as having 
jurisdiction.”); see also Doe Corp. v. Honore, 950 N.E.2d 722, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) 
(determining that the trial court had discretion to determine appropriate sanctions upon a 
party failing to act as required); Harlett, 748 N.E.2d at 924 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that 
the trial court had limited jurisdiction and authority to make certain preliminary 
determinations of law in medical malpractice cases); Sherrow v. GYN, Ltd., 745 N.E.2d 880, 
884 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that trial courts have subject matter jurisdiction “in cases 
where a panel member is alleged to have failed to carry out required statutory duties”). 
72 See infra Part II.C (discussing the various challenges to the Panel requirement of the 
Act, and the two cases that directly address the sufficiency of submissions to a Panel:  
Miller v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend and K.D. v. Chambers). 
73 See Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act:  Results of a Three Year Study, supra note 32, at 
1281, 1284 (informing that “[s]ince 1975, over fifty judicial decisions have interpreted 
provisions of the Act[,]” and that “Indiana courts have played, and continue to play, a 
dynamic role in defining the function and extent of the Act’s provisions”). 
74 See Cha v. Warnick, 476 N.E.2d 109, 114 (Ind. 1995) (upholding the constitutionality of 
the Act by finding that the Panel proceedings were not an unreasonable delay); Johnson v. 
St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d 585, 595 (Ind. 1980) (holding that the Panel requirement of 
the Act did not create impermissible delay and expense, therefore it is constitutional). 
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trial court’s jurisdiction and behavior of panelists.75  However, two major 
decisions address issues with the Act’s prerequisite Panel requirement—
Miller v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend and K.D. v. Chambers.76 
In Miller, the Indiana Supreme Court addressed whether the 
plaintiffs’ proposed complaint to the Panel “sufficiently articulated two 
separate injuries.”77  The plaintiffs, parents of an infant son, alleged that 
the child was injured during birth.78  After the parents settled their claim 
against the doctor, the hospital argued that it could not be liable because 
                                                 
75 See Mooney v. Anonymous M.D. 4, 991 N.E.2d 565, 575 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) 
(establishing that it was within the trial court’s discretion whether to dismiss a proposed 
complaint under the Act and the decision is a “question of law and fact that may be 
preliminarily determined by the trial court in the exercise of its discretion after a hearing”); 
Honore, 950 N.E.2d at 728 (determining that the trial court did have subject matter 
jurisdiction to issue a preliminary determination of law regarding the validity of a Panel 
opinion); Harlett, 748 N.E.2d at 925 (holding that the trial court and court of appeals have 
jurisdiction to determine preliminary issues raised by the parties during the panel process); 
Gleason v. Bush, 664 N.E.2d 1183, 1186 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that the trial court 
has authority to impose sanctions upon parties that fail to comply with Act’s requirement); 
St. Anthony Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Smith, 592 N.E.2d 732, 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that 
the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a medical malpractice action where 
the original complaint was filed in trial court before the proposed complaint was filed with 
the medical review panel and before the Panel rendered an opinion); Galindo v. 
Christensen, 569 N.E.2d 702, 705–06 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (discussing the trial court’s 
authority to impose sanctions when a party “fails to act as required by [the Act] without 
good cause shown”); Kranda v. Houser-Norborg Med. Corp., 419 N.E.2d 1024, 1034 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1981) (challenging two Panel members’ decision being based on casual 
conversations with other physicians). 
76 See Miller v. Mem’l Hosp. of S. Bend, 679 N.E.2d 1329, 1331 (Ind. 1997) (challenging 
the proper articulation of two separate instances of malpractice alleged in a proposed 
complaint); K.D. v. Chambers, 951 N.E.2d 855, 859 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (challenging 
whether additional breaches discovered after the Panel opinion may be raised at trial).  
Other cases have addressed the Panel requirement, but not as in depth as the cases 
discussed in the text of this Note.  See McGill v. Ling, 801 N.E.2d 678, 682 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2004) (“[A] medical malpractice action may not be brought against a health care provider 
until the claimant's proposed complaint has been filed with the [IDOI] and an opinion has 
been issued by a medical review panel.”); Winona Mem’l Hosp. v. Kuester, 737 N.E.2d 824, 
827 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“Submission of a proposed complaint to a medical review panel is 
a condition precedent to filing a medical malpractice claim in Indiana.”). 
77 See Miller, 679 N.E.2d at 1330–32 (explaining the facts of the case and the issue 
addressed by the court).  In Miller, the plaintiffs alleged that their infant son suffered 
injuries caused by the conduct of a doctor and the hospital.  Id. at 1330.  The plaintiffs 
settled with the doctor for the statutory maximum, and pursued their claim against the 
hospital.  Id.  The hospital argued that it could not be liable for the same injury that the 
plaintiffs already received damages for from the doctor.  Id. at 1331.  The plaintiffs claimed 
that they alleged two separate injuries, prenatal injuries by the doctor and postnatal 
injuries by the hospital; therefore, they still had a claim against the hospital for the 
separate, postnatal injury.  Id. 
78 See id. at 1330 (explaining the facts of the case that caused the plaintiffs to seek relief 
through the Act, including the injuries the plaintiffs alleged the health care providers 
caused to their infant son). 
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the plaintiffs would be compensated twice for the same injury.79  The 
plaintiffs argued that the complaint alleged separate injuries against the 
doctor and the hospital.80  The court held that the plaintiffs’ claim against 
the hospital was articulated clear enough to continue the suit, 
determining “the plaintiffs’ action is [not] restricted by the substance of 
the submissions presented to the medical review panel.”81  The court 
reasoned that no requirement exists that requires plaintiffs “to fully 
explicate and provide particulars or legal contentions regarding the 
claim.”82  Furthermore, the court opined “the complaints utilize separate 
counts to assert their claims against the two defendants and specify 
differing dates for each defendant’s alleged acts of malpractice.”83 
In a recent Indiana Court of Appeals decision, K.D. v. Chambers, the 
court addressed whether a plaintiff may raise additional, separate 
breaches in the standard of care by a medical provider at trial, if the 
plaintiff did not previously present evidence of the alleged breaches to 
the Panel.84  The mother of a young boy brought suit against a hospital 
and nurse, alleging the nurse administered excessive amounts of 
medication to the boy.85  Relying on the lack of reference to an additional 
breach in the plaintiff’s proposed complaint, the court determined that at 
trial, the plaintiff may only present evidence of the breach articulated in 
the proposed complaint.86   
                                                 
79 See Miller, 679 N.E.2d at 1331 (articulating the arguments made by the parties that 
were considered by the court, specifically that the plaintiffs argued that they alleged two 
separate injuries, prenatal injuries by the doctor and postnatal injuries by the hospital, thus 
they still had a claim against the hospital for the separate, postnatal injury). 
80 See id. (reviewing the procedural facts of the case and the arguments made by the 
plaintiff in response to the remaining defendant health care provider’s arguments). 
81 See id. at 1332 (providing the court’s holding in Miller, where it held “the plaintiffs’ 
action is [not] restricted by the substance of the submissions presented to the medical 
review panel”). 
82 See id. (explaining the court’s reasoning for holding that the plaintiffs sufficiently 
articulated a separate breach against the remaining defendant health care provider). 
83 See id. (finding that the plaintiffs clearly established that they were asserting separate 
and distinct claims against the two defendants). 
84 See K.D. v. Chambers, 951 N.E.2d 855, 858 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (explaining the court’s 
holding and reasoning).  In Chambers, a young boy was taken to a hospital after bumping 
his head.  Id.  While being treated, a nurse administered an excessive dose of Benadryl to 
the boy, which caused an adverse reaction.  Id.  After being released from the hospital, the 
boy continued to suffer from a tremor, which his parents believed was a result of the 
overdose.  Id.  The parents filed a proposed complaint, alleging carelessness and negligence 
of the hospital, including the nurse, two physicians, and other employees.  Id.  In the 
proposed complaint, the plaintiffs “did not specify any overdose or breaches of the 
standard of care other than the overdose of Benadryl.”  Id. at 859. 
85 See Chambers, 951 N.E.2d at 858 (explaining the facts of the case that caused the 
plaintiffs to file a medical malpractice claim against the defendant health care provider). 
86 Id. at 864.  The court stated: 
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The plaintiffs argued that their case was similar to Miller, and the 
issue is not whether the additional breach was raised, but whether two 
breaches are distinguishable in the proposed complaint.87  The court 
disagreed, determining that the plaintiffs failed “to present all claimed 
breaches of the standard of care” to the Panel.88  The court distinguished 
Miller, holding that the case should not be read so broadly “to allow a 
plaintiff to argue at trial separate breaches of the standard of care that 
were not presented in a submission of evidence to the panel.”89  The 
Indiana Supreme Court chose not to hear the Chambers case, and medical 
malpractice practitioners quickly recognized possible implications of the 
decision.90  In addition to the rules from Miller and Chambers, there are 
                                                                                                             
[T]he question of whether defendants breached the standard of care 
must be presented to the medical review panel and answered based on 
the evidence submitted to it.  It logically follows that a malpractice 
plaintiff cannot present one breach of the standard of care to the panel 
and, after receiving an opinion, proceed to trial and raise claims of 
additional, separate breaches of the standard of care that were not 
presented to the panel and addressed in its opinion. 
Id. 
87 See id. (explaining the parties’ arguments for or against summary judgment); Miller, 
679 N.E.2d at 1331 (explaining the facts, holding, and reasoning). 
88 See Miller, 679 N.E.2d at 1332 (providing the court’s holding and reasoning, where it 
determined “the plaintiffs’ action is [not] restricted by the substance of the submissions 
presented to the medical review panel”). 
89 See Chambers, 951 N.E.2d at 865 (providing the court’s reasoning for distinguishing the 
case from the issue in Miller).  The court stated: 
As we are addressing a different issue, namely, Plaintiffs' failure to 
present all claimed breaches of the standard of care to the Review 
Panel, we do not interpret the above language so broadly as to allow a 
plaintiff to argue at trial separate breaches of the standard of care that 
were not presented in a submission of evidence to the panel. 
Id. 
90 See Chambers, 951 N.E.2d 855 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied, 962 N.E.2d 654 (Ind. 
2011) (stating that the transfer was denied by a two-to-two decision); Hall Render, Can a 
Plaintiff Present Evidence that There Was A Breach in the Standard of Care at Trial When Evidence 
of the Breach of the Standard of Care Was Not Presented to the Medical Review Panel?, LITIGATION 
ANALYSIS (Jan. 6, 2012), http://blogs.hallrender.com/blog/can-a-plaintiff-present-
evidence-that-there-was-a-breach-in-the-standard-of-care-at-trial-when-evidence-of-the-
breach-of-the-standard-of-care-was-not-presented-to-the-medical-review-panel/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/PFY9-4TS3 (reviewing Chambers and determining that “a plaintiff must 
present all claimed breaches of the standard of care to the medical review panel”); Alicia 
Gallegos, Indiana Court:  New Claims Can’t be Added to Lawsuits After Review, AM. MED. NEWS 
(Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.amednews.com/article/20110815/profession/308159941/6/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/4ZUK-6NSJ (discussing the Chambers decision and stating 
“[s]ome plaintiff attorneys, however, are unhappy with the ruling, saying it changes the 
way lawyers must present their cases”); Garau Germano Hanley & Pennington, P.C., 
Medical Review Panel Process Complicated by Indiana Court of Appeal’s Decision, IND. MED. 
MALPRACTICE LAW. BLOG (July 31, 2011, 2:12 PM), http://www.indianapolis-medical-
malpractice-lawyer.com/blog/2011/07/medical-review-panel-process-complicated-
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various tools available to the trial court that relate to the Panel process, 
and can be used during and after the time a Panel renders an opinion.91 
D. The Power and Role of Trial Rules and Judicial Discretion 
Rules that govern trial procedures are also relevant.92  Indiana Trial 
Rule 26, mandating an ongoing duty to update discovery, and Indiana 
Trial Rule 59, which addresses motions to correct errors, are specifically 
important to the Panel process of medical malpractice cases because the 
rules can be used as tools to combat the adverse effects of Chambers.93  
Indiana Trial Rule 8 is also relevant, and will be briefly explained, 
because it calls for pleadings to be construed in a manner that best 
provides justice.94  Additionally, the power of judicial discretion in 
                                                                                                             
by-indiana-court-of-appeals-decision.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc/N3NS-TADS 
(discussing how Chambers will change the way attorneys handle cases).  Garau, Germano, 
Hanley, and Pennington state: 
If the decision stands, it could create significant changes in the way 
Indiana’s medical malpractice attorneys pursue and present their 
cases. . . .  The [decision] looks to change the panel process from an 
informal administrative proceeding into something resembling a full-
blown trial. . . .  The court of appeals’ opinion creates a number of 
problems for Indiana medical malpractice lawyers. . . .  The 
[Chambers] decision now places the burden on lay attorneys and their 
clients to tell the panel what breaches of the standard of care arise from 
the facts of the case, rather than rely on the panel to tell them where 
the breaches are.  If a patient fails to articulate a potential breach in his 
submission to the panel, that breach cannot be raised in the trial court.  
In order to avoid the risk of waiving a claim of negligence, lawyers for 
the patients will now be forced to conduct full discovery at the panel 
process stage.  This will cause the cost of pursuing malpractice claims 
to skyrocket. 
Id.; Brad Catlin, Important Medical Malpractice Opinion on Experts and the Review Panel, IND. L. 
UPDATE BLOG (July 19, 2011), http://www.indianalawupdate.com/2011/07/important-
medical-malpractice-opinion-on-experts-and-the-review-panel/, archived at http://perma. 
cc/CNS4-7MF5 (“the full effect . . . will likely be felt outside the courtroom, rather than in 
it” and will “increase the costs of litigation” and even “prevent lawyers from pursuing 
some otherwise meritorious claims which would otherwise have been pursued”). 
91 See infra Part II.D (discussing judicial discretion, various trial rules, and how they may 
be used during and after the Panel process when evidentiary issues occur). 
92 See infra notes 93–105 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of relevant trial 
rules). 
93 See infra notes 93–105 and accompanying text (explaining Rule 26, which requires 
attorneys to amend information given to other parties when it is received up until trial, and 
Rule 59, which can be used when a party discovers new evidence). 
94 See infra note 106 and accompanying text (providing the statutory language of Trial 
Rule 8, which requires that all pleadings should be construed in a way that provides 
“substantial justice” and fairness). 
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medical malpractice claims will be explored, as well as different areas of 
law where judicial discretion tends to be broader.95 
Indiana Trial Rule 26 plays a large role in the discovery process of 
malpractice claims.96  First, the rule provides the framework for the 
scope of discovery.97  Generally, attorneys may obtain any discovery that 
is relevant to the pending action.98  The rule also governs the 
supplementation of responses, better known as the “ongoing duty” 
rule.99  Under this rule, attorneys have an ongoing duty until trial to 
update information provided to other parties if new information 
suggests the previous information is no longer accurate.100 
                                                 
95 See infra notes 106–09 and accompanying text (explaining that judicial discretion is 
generally wide, but in medical malpractice claims, discretion is constrained by the Panel 
requirement). 
96 See Ind. T.R. 26 (providing the general provisions that govern discovery).  The rule 
plays a role in all civil and criminal claims, but this Note will refer to it in reference to 
medical malpractice claims. 
97 See Ind. T.R. 26(B) (detailing the discovery provisions).  Trial Rule 26(B) states: 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, 
which is relevant to the subject-matter involved in the pending action, 
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking 
discovery or the claim or defense of any other party, including the 
existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any 
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and 
location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. 
Ind. T.R. 26(B)(1) (emphasis added); In re WTHR-TV v. Cline, 693 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ind. 1998) 
(determining that “[a]n item is ‘material’ if it appears that it might benefit the preparation” 
of a party’s case); Hyundai Motor Co. v. Stamper, 651 N.E.2d 803, 808 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) 
(distinguishing relevancy in discovery from relevancy at trial by explaining that “[a] 
document is  relevant to discovery if there is the possibility that the information sought 
may be relevant to the subject matter of the action”). 
98 See supra note 97 (reviewing case law that interprets Trial Rule 26, specifically 
concerning relevancy of evidence in discovery and at trial). 
99 See infra note 100 (implying that the rule also encompasses the rule that attorneys have 
an ongoing duty to update discovery, through statutory language such as “duty 
seasonably” and “no longer true”). 
100 See Ind. T.R. 26(E).  The rule states: 
A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he 
obtains information upon the basis of which 
(a) he knows that the response was incorrect when made, or 
(b)  he knows that the response though correct when made is no 
longer true and the circumstances are such that a failure to amend 
the response is in substance a knowing concealment. 
Id. (emphasis added); see Lucas v. Dorsey Corp., 609 N.E.2d 1191, 1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) 
(“The duty seasonably to supplement a discovery response is absolute and is not 
predicated on a court order.”).  For example, in the hypothetical contained in Part I, once 
the attorney learned new information from Nurse Quinn, the attorney had a duty to share 
the new information with the other parties.  See supra Part I (posing a hypothetical scenario 
in which the plaintiff’s attorney discovers new evidence after a Panel renders an opinion). 
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Indiana Trial Rule 59 is also relevant to malpractice claims and the 
Panel process because it addresses newly discovered evidence.101  Under 
this rule, the trial court may consider evidence discovered after a final 
judgment.102  Moreover, the newly discovered evidence must only be 
supported by affidavits demonstrating its truthfulness.103  Trial judges 
have the authority to grant relief based on the newly discovered 
evidence, including amending the judgment or granting a new trial.104  
Furthermore, the Indiana Supreme Court has articulated a nine-part test 
                                                 
101 See Ind. T.R. 59(A)–(C) (explaining that the motion may be used “when a party seeks 
to address:  (1) [n]ewly discovered evidence . . . capable of production within [thirty] days 
of final judgment which, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered and 
produced at trial”). 
102 See supra note 100 (providing the statutory language that allows evidence discovered 
within thirty days after a final judgment to be considered by the court); see also Babinchak 
v. Town of Chesterton, 598 N.E.2d 1099, 1102–03 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing that a 
motion to correct error may be predicated upon the assertion of newly discovered evidence 
“if the proponent could not, with reasonable diligence, have earlier discovered and 
produced such evidence”); Laudig v. Marion Cnty. Bd. of Voters Registration, 585 N.E.2d 
700, 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).  The court stated: 
To prevail on a motion to correct error based on newly discovered 
evidence, [the proponent] needed to demonstrate that the evidence 
could not have been discovered and produced at trial with reasonable 
diligence; that the evidence is material, relevant, and not merely 
cumulative or impeaching; that the evidence is not incompetent; that 
[the proponent] exercised due diligence to discover the evidence . . . ; 
that the evidence is worthy of credit; and, that the evidence raises a 
strong presumption that a different result would have been reached 
upon retrial. 
Id.  Compare Laudig, 585 N.E.2d at 712 (explaining the elements necessary for a party to 
prevail on a motion to correct error based on newly discovered evidence), with Dumont v. 
Davis, 992 N.E.2d 795, 810 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that despite the defendant’s 
misconduct of attempting “to add a new expert witness” beyond the pre-trial deadline, and 
allowing another expert witness to give medical testimony beyond the area of expertise 
disclosed to the court, the trial court erred in granting a new trial). 
103 See Ind. T.R. 59(H)(1) (“When a motion to correct error is based upon evidence outside 
the record, the motion shall be supported by affidavits showing the truth of the grounds set 
out in the motion and the affidavits shall be served with the motion.”). 
104 Ind. T.R. 59(J).  The rule states: 
The court, if it determines that prejudicial or harmful error has been 
committed, shall take such action as will cure the error, including 
without limitation the following with respect to all or some of the 
parties and all or some of the errors:  (1) Grant a new trial; (2) Enter 
final judgment; (3) Alter, amend, modify or correct judgment; (4) 
Amend or correct the findings or judgment . . . 
Id. 
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to determine whether it is appropriate to grant a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence.105 
Judicial discretion, in combination with Indiana Trial Rule 8, are 
powerful tools available to the trial court judge in all cases, but 
specifically so in medical malpractice cases.106  Indiana Trial Rule 8 is 
relevant to proposed complaints in malpractice actions because it 
instructs courts to construe all pleadings “to do substantial justice, lead 
to disposition on the merits, and avoid litigation of procedural points.”107  
Additionally, statutes in chapter ten of the Act, which shapes the Panel 
process, have been interpreted to allow wide judicial discretion.108  For 
                                                 
105 See Kahlenbeck v. Indiana, 719 N.E.2d 1213, 1218 (Ind. 1999) (articulating the test to 
determine whether it is appropriate for the trial judge to grant a new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence).  The test includes: 
To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant 
must show that (1) the evidence has been discovered since the trial; (2) 
it is material and relevant; (3) it is not cumulative; (4) it is not merely 
impeaching; (5) it is not privileged or incompetent; (6) due diligence 
was used to discover it in time for trial; (7) the evidence is worthy of 
credit; (8) it can be produced on a retrial of the case; and (9) it will 
probably produce a different result. 
Id.  Although this test was formulated in a criminal proceeding, it is relevant to malpractice 
claims because Trial Rule 59 is available for civil and criminal claims.  Ind. T.R. 59.  See also 
Hawkins v. Cannon, 826 N.E.2d 658, 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Kahlenbeck, 719 N.E.2d 
at 1218) (reaffirming that the nine part test must be used to order a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence). 
106 See infra notes 107–09 and accompanying text (discussing Indiana Trial Rule 8 and the 
powerful role of judicial discretion in other areas of law, such as administrative law 
hearings, where judges have wide discretion to remand a case to an agency for further 
investigation). 
107 See Ind. T.R. 8(F) (“[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice, 
lead to disposition on the merits, and avoid litigation of procedural points”).  The 
fraudulent concealment doctrine might also be relevant to the Panel process of medical 
malpractice claims, because the statute of limitations is tolled when a liable party conceals 
information pertinent to another party’s malpractice claim.  See IND. CODE § 34-11-5-1 
(2014) (explaining the fraudulent concealment doctrine); see also Neal F. Eggeston, Jr., 
Snatching Confusion from the Jaws of Clarity:  The Puzzling Evolution of the Discovery Rule Vis-à-
vis Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Statute of Limitations, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 95, 129–31 
(2011) (discussing, among other cases, Boggs v. Tri-State Radiology, Inc., 730 N.E.2d 692 
(Ind. 2000), which touches on the doctrine of fraudulent concealment as it relates to medical 
malpractice claims, specifically addressing statute of limitations concerns); Render et al., 
Health Care Law:  A Survey of 1994 Developments, 28 IND. L. REV. 959, 962 (1995) (discussing 
the application of the fraudulent concealment doctrine to a medical malpractice claim). 
108 See Ramsey v. Moore, 959 N.E.2d 246, 250 (Ind. 2012) (holding that the trial court may 
dismiss a proposed complaint during Panel review for failure to follow the Panel’s 
schedule); Rambo v. Begley, 796 N.E.2d 314, 320 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“[I]t is, however, well 
settled that a trial court is vested with the discretion to impose appropriate sanctions.”); 
Gleason v. Bush, 689 N.E.2d 1183, 1186 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that the trial court 
has authority to impose sanctions upon parties that fail to comply with Act’s requirement); 
Beemer v. Elskens, 677 N.E.2d 1117, 1119 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (considering whether the trial 
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example, trial judges have the sole discretion to determine appropriate 
sanctions when a panelist, attorney, or party fails to comply with the 
requirements of the Act.109  In other areas, such as administrative law 
proceedings, Indiana courts have interpreted judicial discretion so 
broadly as to allow judges to remand cases to investigatory agencies for 
further findings before a judge makes a final determination in the case.110 
Considering the statutes defining the prerequisite Panel 
requirement, conflicting case law such as Miller and Chambers, and all of 
the trial court rules discussed, it is not surprising that similar medical 
                                                                                                             
court abused its discretion by dismissing a proposed complaint); Cleary v. Indiana, 663 
N.E.2d 779, 784 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (“the trial court has broad discretion in ruling on 
violations of discovery”); Jones v. Wasserman, 656 N.E.2d 1195, 1197 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) 
(holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by issuing a sanction for a party’s 
failure to comply with an evidentiary schedule set by the Panel); Rivers v. Methodist 
Hosps., Inc., 654 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (determining that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion when it dismissed a claim due to the party’s bad faith during the 
discovery process); Marshall v. Woodruff, 631 N.E.2d 3, 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (“[t]he trial 
court is vested with broad discretion in ruling on the issues of discovery”); Hudgins v. 
McAtee, 596 N.E.2d 286, 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (“[t]he grant or denial of motions for 
discovery, motions for sanctions, and motions for a continuance rests in the sound 
discretion of the trial court”); Galindo v. R.L. Christensen, M.D., 569 N.E.2d 702, 705 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1991) (discussing the trial court’s authority to impose sanctions); Doe Corp. v. 
Honore, 950 N.E.2d 722, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (determining that the trial court did have 
subject matter jurisdiction to issue a preliminary determination of law regarding the 
validity of a panel opinion); Rust v. Guinn, 429 N.E.2d 299, 305 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (stating 
that the trial court has sound discretion to determine admissibility of evidence). 
109 See supra note 108 (discussing court holdings reinforcing trial judges’ right of judicial 
discretion during Panel review to determine appropriate sanctions for noncompliance with 
the Act’s requirements). 
110 See IND. CODE § 4-21.5-5-12(b) (2012).  The statute states: 
(b) The court may remand a matter to the agency before final 
disposition of a petition for review with directions that the agency 
conduct further factfinding or that the agency prepare an adequate 
record, if: 
(1)  he agency failed to prepare or preserve an adequate record; 
(2) the agency improperly excluded or omitted evidence from the 
record; or 
(3) a relevant law changed after the agency action and the court 
determines that the new provision of law may control the 
outcome. 
Id. (emphasis added); Jackson v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 884 N.E.2d 284, 292 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (interpreting an administrative law statute to allow the trial court to 
“remand the matter to the agency before final disposition of a petition for judicial review 
with directions for that agency to conduct further factfinding”); Jones v. Review Bd. of Ind. 
Emp’t Sec. Div., 405 N.E.2d 601, 604–05 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (“When the administrative 
board's decision precludes an award the findings of fact must exclude every possibility of 
recovery.  If the findings are found to be lacking in these areas the cause should be 
remanded to the board.”). 
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malpractice claims might easily yield very different results.111  Moreover, 
the General Assembly is certainly under pressure to revise or amend the 
Act.112  Even before the Chambers decision, the plaintiffs’ bar was 
pressuring the Indiana General Assembly to amend or repeal parts of the 
Act.113 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Like Governor Bowen’s call to action almost forty years ago, it is 
time for the Indiana General Assembly to readdress the Act.114  Part III 
discusses and analyzes the current state of the Panel requirement of the 
Act and the future of the Panel process with Miller v. Memorial Hospital of 
South Bend and K.D. v. Chambers as precedent.115  First, Part III.A 
discusses general challenges of the Panel requirement and the 
implications of Miller and Chambers.116  Next, Part III.B compares trial 
judges’ discretion to decide preliminary matters and the Panel 
chairman’s discretion to deviate from the statutory requirements of the 
panel procedure with the lack of discretion judges have to determine 
discovery issues after a Panel renders an opinion.117  This section also 
discusses two important discovery rules that affect the panel process—
Trial Rule 34, the ongoing duty rule, and Trial Rule 59, motion to correct 
errors based on newly discovered evidence.  Finally, Part III.C considers 
the roles of the Indiana Supreme Court and the Indiana General 
Assembly, and weighs the concerns of which body is in a better position 
to remedy the inconsistencies caused by Chambers.118  This section also 
                                                 
111 See infra Part III (asserting that the different results reached in Miller and Chambers are 
irreconcilable). 
112 See Steven P. Lammers, Recent Developments in Medical Malpractice, 43 IND. L. REV. 855, 
871 (2010) (providing a survey of recent decisions regarding the Act from October 1, 2008 to 
September 30, 2009, and concluding that, during the survey period, the “General Assembly 
did not add to, amend, or repeal any section of the Act,” although “pressure to do so 
certainly comes from the plaintiff’s bar”). 
113 See Lammers, supra note 112 and accompanying text (asserting that the plaintiff’s bar 
was dissatisfied with the Indiana General Assembly’s lack of legislative action concerning 
the Act from 2008 to 2009). 
114 See supra note 28 and accompanying text (presenting Governor Bowen’s address to the 
Indiana General Assembly, where he called for tort reform). 
115 See infra Part III (analyzing the implications of Miller and Chambers, the statutory 
requirements of the Act, and the tools available that might be useful to remedy the case law 
implications to the Panel process). 
116 See infra Part III.A (discussing the various challenges of the Panel requirement and 
analyzing the Miller and Chambers decisions). 
117  See infra Part III.B (analyzing the varying level of discretion afforded to trial judges in 
medical malpractice claims with the wide discretion afforded in other areas of law). 
118  See infra Part III.C (discussing the advantages and implications of the courts or general 
assembly addressing the inconsistencies created by Miller and Chambers). 
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addresses the concerns of allowing additional evidence to be considered 
after a Panel renders an opinion.119 
A. Inconsistencies and Implications of Miller and Chambers 
In Indiana, a number of cases raise issues with the Panel requirement 
of the Act.120  While courts have addressed various facets of the Panel 
requirement many times, such as constitutionality, jurisdictional, and 
compliance issues, Miller and Chambers are the only cases that directly 
address separate breaches of the applicable standard of care by health 
care providers.121  Although the facts of the cases differ, their similarities 
were overlooked by the appellate court in Chambers, resulting in two 
                                                 
119 See infra Part III.C (discussing the implications of allowing Panels to consider evidence 
of additional breaches after the Panel renders its opinion). 
120 See infra note 121 (discussing challenges raised in court based on the constitutionality 
of the Panel requirement, on grounds such as unreasonable delay, impermissible expense, 
and the trial court’s authority and discretion to impose sanctions). 
121 See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-14 (2014) (giving the court with jurisdiction the authority to 
mandate sanctions for noncompliance by a party, attorney or panelist); Cha v. Warnick, 476 
N.E.2d 109, 114 (Ind. 1985) (upholding the constitutionality of the Act by finding the Panel 
proceedings not to be an unreasonable delay); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 
N.E.2d 585, 592 (Ind. 1980) (holding that the Panel requirement of the Act did not create 
impermissible delay and expense, therefore is constitutional); see also Doe Corp. v. Honore, 
950 N.E.2d 722, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (determining the trial court did have subject matter 
jurisdiction to issue a preliminary determination of law regarding the validity of the Panel 
opinion); Harlett v. St. Vincent Hosps. & Health Svcs., 748 N.E.2d 921, 924 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2001) (holding that the trial court and court of appeals have jurisdiction to determine 
preliminary issues raised by the parties during the Panel process); Gleason v. Bush, 689 
N.E.2d 1183, 1186 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that the trial court has authority to 
impose sanctions upon parties that fail to comply with the Act’s requirement); Galindo v. 
R.L. Christensen, M.D., 569 N.E.2d 702, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (determining that the trial 
court has authority to impose sanctions when a party “fails to act as required by this 
chapter without good cause shown”).  The basic rule, as defined in chapter eight of the Act 
and subsequent case law, is that “an action against a health care provider may not be 
commenced in a court in Indiana before:  (1) the claimant’s proposed complaint has been 
presented to a medical review panel . . . and (2) an opinion is given by the panel.”  IND. 
CODE § 34-18-8-4 (2014).  See McGill v. Ling, 801 N.E.2d 678, 682 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“[A] 
medical malpractice action may not be brought against a health care provider until the 
claimant's proposed complaint has been filed with the [IDOI] and an opinion has been 
issued by a medical review panel.”); Winona Mem. Hosp. v. Kuester, 737 N.E.2d 824, 827 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“Submission of a proposed complaint to a medical review panel is a 
condition precedent to filing a medical malpractice claim in Indiana”); St. Anthony Med. 
Ctr. v. Smith, 592 N.E.2d 732, 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the trial court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over a medical malpractice action where the original complaint 
was filed in the trial court before the proposed complaint was filed with the Panel and 
before the Panel rendered an opinion). 
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opinions that are irreconcilable by trial judges, medical malpractice 
attorneys, and parties in future medical malpractice cases.122 
At issue in Miller was whether malpractice plaintiffs “sufficiently 
articulated two separate injuries so as to avoid certain limitations 
imposed by the [Act.]”123  The Indiana Supreme Court refused to limit 
the reading of general injury allegations in the proposed complaint as 
only alleging that one breach occurred by two defendant health care 
providers.124  The court’s willingness to read a proposed complaint 
broadly, and therefore not precluding the plaintiffs from litigating their 
case, should be the standard practice of trial and appellate courts.125  
With this rule as precedent, Chambers was decided fourteen years later.126 
The facts in Chambers are simple, which made it an easy case for the 
Indiana Court of Appeals to deliver this straightforward rule—
additional breaches of the standard of care by health care providers, 
which are discovered after a Panel renders an opinion, cannot be raised 
at trial.127  But the Court did not take into consideration future cases that 
will not fit so neatly inside this rule.128  There will be instances where 
                                                 
122 See supra notes 77–89 and accompanying text (discussing the facts, holding, and 
reasoning in Miller and Chambers). 
123 See supra note 77 and accompanying text (recounting the pertinent facts of the Miller 
case, as well as the court’s holding and reasoning).  After the plaintiffs received an opinion 
from the Panel based on a proposed complaint and the submission of evidence, the 
plaintiffs used a virtually identical complaint in their filing with the trial court.  Miller v. 
Mem. Hosp. of S. Bend, Inc., 679 N.E.2d 1329, 1332 (Ind. 1997).  The plaintiffs settled with 
one defendant health care provider, leaving one other defendant health care provider in the 
suit.  Id. at 1330. 
124  See supra note 77 and accompanying text (articulating the facts of Miller and the 
nature of the breaches alleged by the plaintiffs in the proposed complaint). 
125 See supra note 81 (reviewing the Miller holding that the substance of the plaintiffs’ 
submissions to the Panel does not restrict the plaintiffs from continuing to pursue their 
medical malpractice claim against the remaining defendant health care provider). 
126 See supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text (discussing Chambers and the appellate 
court’s interpretation of the application of Miller). 
127 See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text (explaining the facts of the Chambers case 
and the broad rule the court created).  The plaintiff alleged in the proposed complaint:  
“[t]he two physicians were careless and negligent in the care and treatment of [plaintiff], as 
[plaintiff] suffered a Benadryl overdose while under their care.  [Plaintiff] received various 
other overdoses while under the care of defendant.”  K.D. v. Chambers, 951 N.E.2d 855, 858 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011).  At issue was the vagueness of the second allegation of “receiv[ing] 
various other overdoses[.]”  Id.  The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that pleading 
“various other overdoses” was sufficient under Indiana’s notice pleading.  Id. at 858–59.  
The Court explained that the notice pleading was “not per se insufficient,” but took issue 
with the pleading because “no evidence of any breaches besides the overdose of Benadryl” 
was contained in the plaintiff’s submission to the panel.  Id. at 864. 
128 See supra notes 82–89 and accompanying text (explaining the Chambers court’s 
reasoning for its decision).  Instead, the court differentiates the plaintiff’s case from the 
facts of Miller.  Chambers, 951 N.E.2d at 865.  In Miller, the Indiana Supreme Court held that 
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evidence of an additional breach is not discovered until after a Panel 
opinion is rendered.129  With Chambers as precedent, this evidence cannot 
be presented at trial under any circumstances.130 
The Chambers rule leaves Indiana trial judges in a frustrating position 
to properly—and fairly—address evidentiary issues that arise after a 
Panel renders an opinion.131  In theory, the rule eliminates surprises at 
trial.132  The rule would serve that purpose if it were interpreted in the 
following manner:  one party should not be blind-sided by (1) the 
introduction of a brand new breach argument; and (2) evidence at trial 
that was not brought to the table earlier.133  However, in practice, the 
decision eliminates judges’ discretion to resolve discovery issues.134  
                                                                                                             
the plaintiffs are not required to raise a distinction between two injuries in a panel 
submission.  Miller, 679 N.E.2d at 1332. 
129 See, e.g., supra Part I (offering a hypothetical scenario that outlines the problems 
created by Chambers).  Additional examples include the discovery of medical records that 
were previously thought to be “lost,” or information in medical charts that is later verified 
to be inaccurate by a previously-unavailable witness.  See also supra Part I (providing a 
hypothetical situation outlining the problems that may arise with the current provisions in 
the Act and the court’s interpretation of the Act); Hawkins v. Cannon, 826 N.E.2d 658, 663 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (arguing that newly discovered evidence, a video, that was not 
available during the trial, should be considered by the court through a motion to correct 
error).  A specific rule that addresses how to proceed with and present newly discovered 
evidence strengthens the argument that courts make every effort to permit all relevant 
evidence, discovered in good faith, regardless of when it is discovered.  For additional 
resources and discussion of the fraudulent concealment doctrine, see Eggeston, supra note 
107, at 129–31 and accompanying text (discussing, among other cases, Boggs v. Tri-State 
Radiology, Inc., 730 N.E.2d 692 (Ind. 2000), which touches on the doctrine of fraudulent 
concealment as it relates to medical malpractice claims, specifically addressing statute of 
limitations concerns).  This Note is not directed at evidence discovered as a result of “bad 
lawyering,” which is precisely what Chambers is meant to prevent. 
130 See supra note 86 and accompanying text (presenting the Court’s holding in Chambers, 
where it determined that at trial, medical malpractice plaintiffs may only present evidence 
of a breach of the applicable standard of care that was articulated in the proposed 
complaint and reviewed by the Panel). 
131 See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the holding from Chambers); infra 
notes 136–41 and accompanying text (arguing that trial courts will face difficult decisions in 
future cases if they must decide whether a case more closely resembles Miller or Chambers). 
132 See supra notes 82–89 (explaining the court’s reasoning for creating the broad rule 
created by the Chambers opinion). 
133 See infra note 136–39 and accompanying text (arguing that a more narrow reading of 
Chambers is appropriate in some cases in order to allow trial courts to make a fair decision). 
134 See supra note 142 and accompanying text (asserting that the rule from Chambers does 
not allow judicial discretion to formulate an appropriate remedy, but instead, imposes a 
broad rule that is not appropriate in all circumstances).  Judges have historically been 
granted wide discretion to deal with discovery issues.  See Cleary v. Indiana, 663 N.E.2d 
779, 784 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (“[T]he trial court has broad discretion in ruling on violations 
of discovery.”); Marshall v. Woodruff, 631 N.E.2d 3, 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (“The trial court 
is vested with broad discretion in ruling on the issues of discovery.”); Hudgins v. McAtee, 
596 N.E.2d 286, 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (“The grant or denial of motions for discovery, 
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Looking beyond a cut and dry scenario, like the facts of Chambers, 
Indiana courts will, at some point, be faced with a situation where 
evidence discovered after a Panel opinion will cause substantial injustice 
if the trial judge does not have the authority to provide a remedy for the 
inadmissibility of the evidence.135 
Trial courts will be placed in a difficult situation if they are forced to 
adopt a narrow reading of Miller and a broad reading of Chambers.136  
First, expecting trial courts to follow a narrow reading of a rule from an 
appellate court over a broad reading of a rule set out by the state’s high 
court works completely against the hierarchical composition of our court 
system.137  Second, the Chambers opinion did not give any indication that 
the holding was fact-specific, or recognize that the holding might not be 
generally applicable to future cases.138  Had the court acknowledged that 
exceptions to its rule might exist, trial courts would have the necessary 
breathing room to follow the Miller rule instead of Chambers rule.139  
Finally, if trial courts are forced to follow Chambers in all cases in which 
defendant health care providers argue that separate breaches were not 
articulated in the proposed complaint, plaintiffs will be barred from 
proving at trial that potentially liable health care providers contributed 
to the injury of a patient.140  Other tools, namely judicial discretion, are 
available in trial courts in order to remedy the incompatibility of Miller 
and Chambers.141 
                                                                                                             
motions for sanctions, and motions for a continuance rests in the sound discretion of the 
trial court.”). 
135 See infra Part IV (resolving the issues discussed in Part III with a proposed section to 
chapter ten of the Act, which creates wide judicial discretion); infra Part V (revisiting the 
hypothetical scenario posed in Part I and reconciling the problem through the proposed 
statutory section introduced in Part IV). 
136 See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s holding and 
reasoning in Miller); supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s 
holding and reasoning in Chambers). 
137 See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text (reviewing the Miller court’s holding and 
reasoning); supra note 86–89 and accompanying text (reviewing the Chambers court’s 
holding and reasoning). 
138 See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text (presenting the court’s brief reasoning in 
Chambers that led it to create such a broad rule with no mention of any possible exceptions). 
139 See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s broad reasoning 
in Chambers, and that the Chambers court merely distinguished the Miller holding, instead of 
creating a small exception to the Miller rule). 
140 See infra notes 159–61 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of the 
Chambers decision if trial judges are forced to follow a broad rule of law, instead of using 
judicial discretion to determine whether the Panel should consider newly discovered 
evidence under any circumstances). 
141 See infra Part III.B (discussing judicial discretion and discovery rules that can be used 
during the Panel process in order to correctly address cases where new evidence is 
discovered after a Panel renders an opinion). 
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B. Using Judicial Discretion to Remedy Case Law Inconsistencies 
Chambers does not discuss the option of leaving discretion to trial 
judges when new evidence is discovered.142  But other provisions in 
chapter ten of the Act have been interpreted to provide trial courts with 
authority and discretion to make certain findings before a panel renders 
an opinion.143  For example, courts have wide discretion to determine 
whether to impose sanctions for noncompliance with the Act’s 
requirements.144  In other areas of law, such as the relationship between 
administrative agency decisions and trial courts, courts have also been 
given discretion to remand cases to respective agencies for further 
determinations.145  Additionally, a feature of the panel process’ informal 
design is that the panel chairman is afforded wide discretion to allow or 
disallow parties to deviate from the guidelines set out in chapter ten.146  
                                                 
142  See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s reasoning in 
Chambers that led it to create such a broad rule with no exceptions). 
143 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-18-10-14 (2014) (granting the trial court jurisdiction and the 
authority to mandate sanctions for noncompliance by a party, attorney, or panelist).  
Additionally, there are other instances in which trial judges are afforded discretion to 
remand a case to an administrative agency for further review.  See id. § 4-21.5-5-12(b).  The 
Code states: 
(b) The court may remand a matter to the agency before final 
disposition of a petition for review with directions that the agency 
conduct further factfinding or that the agency prepare an adequate 
record, if:  (1) the agency failed to prepare or preserve an adequate 
record; (2) the agency improperly excluded or omitted evidence from 
the record; or (3) a relevant law changed after the agency action and 
the court determines that the new provision of law may control the 
outcome. 
Id. 
144  See supra note 108 (reviewing Indiana cases where courts have determined that trial 
judges have wide discretionary authority to sanction parties for noncompliance during the 
Panel process); Gleason v. Bush, 689 N.E.2d 1183, 1186 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that 
the trial court has authority to impose sanctions upon parties that fail to comply with the 
Act’s requirement); Galindo v. R.L. Christensen, M.D., 569 N.E.2d 702, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1991) (discussing the trial court’s authority to impose sanctions when a party “fails to act as 
required by this chapter without good cause shown”). 
145 See Jackson v. Ind. Fam. & Soc. Svcs. Admin., 884 N.E.2d 284, 292 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) 
(interpreting an administrative law statute to allow the trial court to “remand the matter to 
the agency before final disposition of a petition for judicial review with directions for that 
agency to conduct further factfinding”); Jones v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 405 
N.E.2d 601, 604–05 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (“When the administrative board's decision 
precludes an award the findings of fact must exclude every possibility of recovery.  If the 
findings are found to be lacking in these areas the cause should be remanded to the board.” 
(citations omitted)). 
146 See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-20 (2014) (“Meetings shall be informal.”); see also Kemper, 
supra note 31, at 1141 (“The panel is not bound by formalities.”).  The panel chairman has 
discretion in determining if a party or panelist may go beyond a deadline set by the Act.  
See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-3 (2014) (giving the panel chairman authority to serve in an 
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Moreover, attorneys have an ongoing duty to update discovery, 
suggesting newly discovered evidence is intended to be included in the 
judicial process.147 
Along with an attorney’s ongoing duty to update discovery comes 
the possibility of the discovery of new evidence that suggests an 
additional, separate breach in the standard of care by a medical 
provider.148  When a party discovers new evidence, the next step to be 
able to use this new evidence seemingly should be to submit it to the 
Panel for an additional determination of whether this evidence suggests 
a separate breach in the standard of care.149  However, no mechanism 
exists that allows a party to request that a Panel evaluate new evidence 
for an additional breach after that Panel renders its opinion.150  
Essentially, Chambers takes the discretion to do so out of the hands of 
trial judges.151 
                                                                                                             
advisory capacity); Doe Corp. v. Honore, 950 N.E.2d 722, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) 
(affirming statutory language giving the panel chair an advisory role); Kranda v. Houser-
Norborg Med. Corp., 419 N.E.2d 1024, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (extending the chairman’s 
authority to include the allowance of additional evidence to be submitted to the panel 
before it renders an opinion).  IND. CODE § 34-18-10-20(a) (2014).  The statute states: 
Either party, after submission of all evidence and upon ten (10) days 
notice to the other side, has the right to convene the panel at a time and 
place agreeable to the members of the panel.  Either party may 
question the panel concerning any matters relevant to issues to be 
decided by the panel before the issuance of the panel’s report. 
Id. 
147 See Ind. T.R. 34 (discussing the scope of discovery and production of requested 
documents).  The rule does not directly state this proposition.  However, discovery can 
continue up until a trial and after a final judgment. 
148 See id. (discussing Ind. T.R. 34 concerning the scope of discovery and production of 
requested documents); supra note 100 and accompanying text (providing the statutory 
language of the “ongoing duty” rule). 
149 See infra Part IV.B (arguing that the proposed statutory language will remedy this 
problem); see also Kemper, supra note 31, at 1141 (“If new theories are submitted to a court 
after the panel opinion is rendered, the defendant has a basis to argue for reconvening the 
panel and submitting the new claims to the panel.”) 
150 See supra notes 136–41 and accompanying text (asserting that the implications of the 
Chambers decision will be felt in future medical malpractice cases, mainly because the rule 
is irreconcilable with the Miller decision, and it does not allow judicial discretion). 
151 See supra notes 136–41 and accompanying text (presenting the implications of the 
Chambers decision); see also Murphy, supra note 61, at 179 (discussing the Medical 
Malpractice Act many years before Chambers, where Murphy, an attorney, essentially 
predicts the problem addressed by this Note).  Murphy points out: 
A good argument can be made that a plaintiff should be barred from 
presenting any evidence at trial concerning an act or acts of 
malpractice, which were not charged in the complaint or presented to 
the panel prior to the rendition of its opinion.  If the plaintiff fails to 
submit such evidence, then obviously the purpose of panel screening is 
circumvented. 
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Also consider Indiana Trial Rule 59, addressing when parties may 
file a motion to correct errors.152  This rule directly addresses the 
admission of newly discovered evidence—that is, evidence discovered as 
late as after a final judgment is entered.153  When a motion to correct 
error based on evidence outside the record is used, the motion must only 
be “supported by affidavits showing the truth of the grounds set out in 
the motion and the affidavits shall be served with the motion.”154  By 
only requiring its truthfulness to be supported by affidavits, the 
language of this rule suggests the high value of newly discovered 
evidence that could alter the decision of the case.155  Coupled with the 
various trial rules discussed, these additional rules present a strong 
indication that Indiana courts should have the authority to determine 
when newly discovered evidence, even in a medical malpractice case 
with a Panel requirement, is admissible.156 
Miller and Chambers cannot be reconciled with these rules of 
evidence and trial rules unless trial judges are afforded discretion to 
consider newly discovered evidence.157  The Act only mandates that an 
action “may not be commenced” before “the claimant’s proposed 
complaint has been presented to” a Panel.158  The Act does not include 
language that states parties are only entitled to one Panel opinion, 
                                                                                                             
Id.  This is the most direct recognition of the problem addressed in this Note.  Interestingly, 
the article was written more than a decade before Chambers was decided, and has not been 
discussed in further detail in any other source. 
152 See supra note 100 and accompanying text (providing the statutory language for a 
motion to correct errors, and discussing how this trial rule works and how it can be used in 
medical malpractice cases). 
153 See supra note 100 and accompanying text (explaining the broad scope of a motion to 
correct errors). 
154 See Ind. T.R. 59(H)(1) (“When a motion to correct error is based upon evidence outside 
the record, the motion shall be supported by affidavits showing the truth of the grounds set 
out in the motion and the affidavits shall be served with the motion.”). 
155 See supra note 100 and accompanying text (reviewing the statutory language and 
explaining how this trial rule can be used in medical malpractice cases). 
156 See supra Part II.D (explaining the general applicability of the trial rules as they relate 
to medical malpractice cases, and the various instances where the rules have been used in 
medical malpractice cases). 
157 See supra Part II.C (presenting case discussions for Miller and Chambers); supra Part II.D 
(discussing the various trial rules that can be used after the Panel process). 
158 IND. CODE § 34-18-8-4(1) (2014).  The Code states: 
Notwithstanding section 1 of this chapter, and except as provided in 
sections 5 and 6 of this chapter, an action against a health care provider 
may not be commenced in a court in Indiana before:  (1) the claimant's 
proposed complaint has been presented to a medical review panel 
established under IC 34-18-10 (or IC 27-12-10 before its repeal); and (2) 
an opinion is given by the panel. 
Id. 
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therefore the Chambers opinion should not be used to have that effect.159  
Interpreting Chambers to bar additional Panel review, even when a trial 
judge finds that it is appropriate and not allowing a Panel to review it 
will create injustice, in effect creates a new statute.160  This is clearly the 
job of the Indiana General Assembly, which can receive input from trial 
attorneys, the IDOI, health care providers, and concerned citizens, not 
just the appellate court.161 
Through judicial discretion, trial judges can determine when, and if, 
newly discovered evidence should be subject to additional review by a 
Panel in order to fairly adjudicate the plaintiff’s case.162  Since trial judges 
have wide discretion to decide other evidentiary matters, from deadline 
extensions to sanctions, the Act should afford the necessary breathing 
room to allow newly discovered evidence to be admitted when a trial 
judge determines the evidence, which the Panel did not previously 
review, should be considered by the trier of fact.163  In order for trial 
judges across the state to exercise broad judicial discretion in these 
instances, the Indiana Supreme Court or General Assembly must clarify 
the permissible uses and limits of judicial discretion regarding the Panel 
process.164 
C. The Roles of the Indiana Supreme Court and General Assembly 
By denying transfer, the Indiana Supreme Court leaves many 
answerable questions unresolved.165  Though some might argue the best 
remedy is to let case law develop, the Chambers decision will allow 
evidence to be unfairly excluded until the issue is more thoroughly 
                                                 
159 See supra note 63 and accompanying text (providing the statutory language from the 
Act that requires a Panel to render an opinion, and various case law discussing a Panel’s 
responsibilities under the Act). 
160 See supra notes 84–90 and accompanying text (discussing the facts, holding, and 
reasoning in the Chambers case, including the Chambers court’s unwillingness to carve out 
any exceptions to the broad rule it created). 
161 See supra Part II.A (discussing the Indiana General Assembly’s call to action from 
Governor Bowen and the creation of the Act by the General Assembly). 
162 See infra Part IV.A (proposing a possible solution to allow newly discovered evidence 
to be evaluated by a Panel or judge with broad judicial discretion to determine whether a 
case is appropriate for additional Panel review). 
163 See supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text (reviewing examples of the legislature 
providing wide judicial discretion in other matters that arise during the Panel process, such 
as a trial judge’s authority to impose sanctions for noncompliance by an attorney). 
164 See infra Part III.C (exploring whether the Indiana Supreme Court or the Indiana 
General Assembly is the best decision maker to clarify the bounds of judicial discretion 
during the Panel process). 
165 See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing the Indiana Supreme Court’s 
decision to deny transfer, thus refusing to hear the Chambers case and then providing an 
opinion about its broad holding). 
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addressed.166  There is no way of knowing when the right case with a 
perfect fact scenario will come along and find its way in front of the 
Indiana Supreme Court.167  Silence by the court is a strong indicator that 
the legislature is in a better position to remedy the problem.168  The 
legislature can fully examine the difficulties with the Panel process and 
optimize its usefulness.169 
There are three viable concerns against allowing Panels to review 
additional breaches discovered after an opinion is rendered:  (1) it will 
add length to an already lengthy process; (2) this situation is not one that 
occurs regularly; and (3) it will give lawyers the dreaded “second bite at 
the apple.”170  The first concern is understandable, considering the 
Indiana Supreme Court has continuously considered whether the Panel 
requirement is an unconstitutional delay.171  The trial judge can easily 
control these concerns with judicial discretion.172  Discretion will allow 
judges to ensure any additional review is brief, and to discern the parties 
who truly made a good-faith discovery after a Panel renders an opinion 
                                                 
166 See infra notes 190–92 (examining the possible implications of altering the Panel 
chapter of the Act); infra note 194 (addressing the probability of allowing the issue to be 
resolved by the Indiana Supreme Court at some point in the future). 
167 See infra note 194 (asserting that since the issue is not common, it is not likely to be 
raised with regularity in court, and therefore creates uncertainty as to when the Indiana 
Supreme Court might ever have the opportunity to decide the issue). 
168 See infra note 194 and accompanying text (exploring the possibility that the best 
remedy is to let the case law develop over time).  The legislature is in a better position 
because it can receive feedback from all parties involved and interested in the Act, such as 
plaintiffs, attorneys, medical providers, and insurance companies.  See Lammers, supra note 
112 and accompanying text (discussing discontent by Indiana attorneys and their call to the 
Indiana General Assembly to re-examine the Act).  This Note does not address the issue of 
whether the entire Act is in need of an overhaul by the legislature. 
169 See infra note 195 and accompanying text (arguing that the Indiana General Assembly 
is in the best position to offer a comprehensive remedy to this issue because it can receive 
input from trial attorneys, trial judges, the IDOI, health care providers, and concerned 
citizens). 
170 See infra notes 190–92 and accompanying text (addressing the potential concerns with 
the proposed statutory language). 
171 See supra note 74 (citing Indiana Supreme Court decisions upholding the Act’s 
constitutionality because the Panel process was not found to be an unreasonable delay or 
expense); see also Kemper et al., supra note 31, at 1143–45 (discussing various bases for 
constitutional challenges of the Act); Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act:  Results of a Three Year 
Study, supra note 32, at 1303 (reviewing the constitutionality of the delays caused by the 
Panel process); Hurlbut, supra note 39, at 507 (examining the constitutional challenges to 
the Act); Williams, supra note 60, at 497 (explaining why the constitutionality of the Act was 
challenged, focusing on the delay caused by Panel review). 
172 See supra notes 106–10 (discussing the various areas of law that trial judges have wide 
discretion to resolve evidentiary issues, such as administrative law hearings). 
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from those that did not complete due diligence in their discovery efforts 
before the Panel renders an opinion.173 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
Although the Panel requirement of the Act adds a significant amount 
of time to the life of a medical malpractice lawsuit, if adequate 
limitations are included, Panels can take a second look at new evidence 
in cases where a party discovers an additional breach in the standard of 
care after a Panel decision, without creating a substantial delay to the 
process.174  Amending the Act to give judges discretion to remand cases 
in limited instances is an effective way of eliminating the issue of barring 
plaintiffs from arguing additional breaches at trial.175  However, this 
proposition is based on the plaintiff raising an additional breach that he 
could not reasonably discover before a Panel renders an opinion. 
The Indiana General Assembly must reconcile the various tools 
available that already provide trial judges with discretion when dealing 
with evidentiary issues and the respective arguments for and against 
changing the Panel process of the Act.176  Judges, panelists, parties, 
attorneys, the IDOI, and health care providers all need clear direction on 
how to address additional evidence discovered after a Panel renders an 
opinion.177  The General Assembly is in a position to provide a legislative 
                                                 
173 See also Ind. T.R. 8(F) (“All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice, 
lead to disposition on the merits, and avoid litigation of procedural points.”).  This rule 
encompasses the overall reasoning for this Note.  Judges are capable of differentiating the 
good from the bad, so they should be afforded the opportunity to do so.  For example, 
given discretion, a judge could easily differentiate a party who tries to save money by not 
hiring an expert to look over a patient’s medical records before submitting evidence to a 
panel from a party that found, after a panel rendered an opinion, that a hospital employee 
did not accurately notate steps taken to resuscitate a patient.  Revisit the hypothetical posed 
in Part I of this Note, and compare that situation with “save money by not hiring an 
expert” scenario described above. 
174 See supra Part II.B (explaining the issues with the extended length of the Panel process 
in light of the short statutory deadlines); infra Part IV.B (arguing that any additional delay 
caused by a second Panel review will be minimal due to strict time limitations imposed by 
the proposed section to chapter ten of the Act). 
175 See supra Part I (posing a hypothetical situation where the plaintiff discovered 
evidence of an additional breach after the Panel rendered an opinion, therefore making the 
new evidence inadmissible under Chambers). 
176 See supra Part II.D (explaining the trial rules relevant to the Panel process); supra Part 
III.C (addressing the Indiana General Assembly’s potential role in reconciling the 
implications created by Chambers). 
177 See infra Part IV.A (providing a proposed section to chapter 10 of the Act that will 
allow trial judges to remand cases to a Panel for further review, and includes strict time 
limitations for this additional process). 
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remedy to this problem by adding an additional section to chapter ten of 
the Act that allows broad judicial discretion.178 
The remainder of this Part focuses on proposing an additional 
section that the Indiana General Assembly can add to chapter ten of the 
Act.179  The language included in this proposed section will ensure that 
judges, parties, and panelists have proper guidance of the limited 
instances in which it is appropriate to remand a case to a Panel for 
further review, the evidence that may be submitted to the Panel on 
remand, and the time limitations of an additional Panel determination.180 
A. Proposed Section to the Act’s Chapter Addressing Panel Requirements 
The Indiana General Assembly should insert the proposed section 
between section 34-18-10-22, discussing the Panel’s duties and available 
opinions, and section 34-18-10-23, discussing the admissibility of the 
Panel’s report as evidence at trial.181  The Indiana General Assembly 
should place it there because the situation the proposed section 
addresses will occur in sequence between the Panel’s initial opinion and 
the use of the Panel’s opinion at trial.182 
The Indiana General Assembly should amend the Act to include the 
proposed section, as follows: 
(a) Upon good faith discovery of any materially relevant 
evidence after a Panel opinion is rendered, a party shall 
promptly notify the court and all parties. 
(b) The evidence must lead the party to reasonably believe a 
separate, additional breach in the applicable standard of 
care occurred that was not known at the time of the 
original Panel submission and could not reasonably be 
discovered at that time. 
                                                 
178 See supra Part III (addressing the concerns created by the conflicting opinions in Miller 
and Chambers); infra Part IV.A (proposing an additional section for chapter ten of the Act to 
address the concerns raised in Part III). 
179 See infra Part IV.A (providing new statutory language to add to chapter ten of the Act 
to alleviate the inconsistencies of Miller and Chambers); infra Part IV.B (discussing the 
suggested placement of the proposed section, the reasoning for placing the section between 
two other statutes in chapter ten, and addressing the potential criticisms of the proposed 
section). 
180 See infra note 192 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of clear guidance 
to trial judges, parties, and Panelists to ensure the additional review is limited and timely). 
181 The reason for the suggested placement of the proposed section is the contribution of 
the author. 
182 The suggested placement of the proposed section is the contribution of the author. 
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(c) The party must notify the court of the discovery and 
request a hearing, which must be held within thirty (30) 
days of making the request. 
(d) The trial judge shall have broad discretion to determine, 
based on a reasonableness standard, whether the Panel 
should consider the newly discovered evidence before the 
case is further adjudicated. 
(e) If the judge determines a Panel should consider this 
evidence, the judge may remand the case for further Panel 
review, or, if justice requires, make a judicial 
determination whether the evidence is admissible without 
Panel review. 
(f) The Panel shall be comprised of the same members of the 
original Panel appointed to the case, and if any original 
member is unavailable, the trial judge shall appoint a 
replacement. 
(g) The same Panel chairman, if available, shall oversee the 
process, and make every reasonable effort to ensure the 
Panel renders a timely opinion. 
(h) The parties shall have thirty (30) days to prepare 
additional evidence to submit to the Panel.  The evidence 
shall be limited only to evidence reasonably related to the 
moving party’s claim of an additional breach in the 
standard of care.  The trial judge may not grant an 
extension of time to any party. 
(i) The Panel shall have sixty (60) days to review the 
submitted evidence and render a written opinion.  The 
opinion shall be delivered to the trial court and all parties.  
The trial judge shall have the discretion to grant one (1) 
extension of time, no more than thirty (30) days, if 
requested by the Panel. 
(j) To expedite the Panel’s deliberation, the Panel does not 
have to meet in person to discuss the evidence.  Telephone 
conferences and video conferences are permitted so long as 
all panelists are present for the conferences.  Panelists are 
subject to sanctions by the court for failure to make every 
reasonable effort to ensure the timeliness of the Panel’s 
opinion. 
(k) The Panel may request that the trial court convene the 
parties to present arguments concerning only the 
additional evidence.  If the Panel selects this process, all 
panelists must be present and an opinion may be rendered 
at the conclusion of the hearing. 
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(l) If the panelists request additional time to deliberate after 
parties present arguments, the Panel must render its 
expert opinion, in writing, within thirty (30) days of the 
hearing. 
(m) The trial court shall have limited jurisdiction during the 
course of the remand, and may impose sanctions upon 
any panelist, attorney, or party who causes unreasonable 
delay in the process. 
(n) All other sections of the statute set out in the Act, to the 
extent they do not contradict these provisions, shall 
apply.183 
B. Commentary 
Most subsections are crafted with brief time periods so that parties, 
the trial judge, and the Panel cannot create an unreasonable delay.184  
Subsection c requires that the initial hearing to address evidence of an 
additional breach must be held within thirty days of when a party 
notifies the court.185  Subsections f and g attempt to reassemble the same 
Panel that previously examined the evidence in the case.186  Subsection i 
limits the Panel’s time to issue an additional expert opinion to sixty days, 
and subsection l only allows the trial judge to grant the Panel one thirty 
day time extension to issue its opinion, if needed.187 
This proposed section is the best solution because it gives clear 
direction and guidance to parties, attorneys, trial judges, and panelists.  
                                                 
183 The proposed section is italicized and is the contribution of the author. 
184 See supra note 183 and accompanying text (providing the proposed section to chapter 
ten of the Act, which includes subsections with short time limitations). 
185 See supra note 183 and accompanying text (“(c) The party must notify the court of the 
discovery and request a hearing, which must be held within thirty (30) days of making the 
request.”). 
186 See supra note 183 and accompanying text (“(f) The Panel shall be comprised of the same 
members of the original panel appointed to the case, and if any original member is unavailable, the 
trial judge shall appoint a replacement.  (g) The same Panel chairman, if available, shall oversee the 
process, and make every reasonable effort to ensure the Panel renders a timely opinion.”). 
187 See supra note 183 and accompanying text (providing the proposed statutory language 
to chapter ten of the Act).  It states: 
(i) The Panel shall have sixty (60) days to review the submitted evidence 
and render a written opinion.  The opinion shall be delivered to the trial court 
and all parties.  The trial judge shall have the discretion to grant one (1) 
extension of time, if requested. 
(l) If the panelists request additional time to deliberate after parties present 
arguments, the Panel must render its expert opinion, in writing, within thirty 
(30) days of the hearing. 
Id. 
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The proposed section also ensures any additional delay is minimal by 
requiring the trial judge to enforce thirty to sixty day deadlines on 
attorneys and panelists.188  Furthermore, the proposed section only 
allows the trial judge to grant one thirty day extension to the Panel, and 
zero time extensions to the parties, which will ensure the additional Panel 
review is timely.189 
There are two major arguments and a few concerns against 
amending the Act.  First, critics may argue that the Indiana Supreme 
Court is best left to resolve this issue because it has already set precedent 
with Miller.190  Second, critics may argue that allowing judges to remand 
cases for an additional determination from a Panel will significantly 
increase the length of time to resolve an already lengthy process.191  
However, the proposed section includes strict time limitations for 
additional Panel review to ensure any further delay is minimal.192  By 
remanding the case to the Panel that reviewed the original submission 
and is familiar with the evidence, rather than assigning it to a new Panel, 
the length of time required can be significantly decreased. 
A legislative solution created by the Indiana General Assembly is the 
most direct and effective way to remedy the inconsistencies in Miller and 
Chambers.193  Waiting for the Indiana Supreme Court to accept an 
appropriate case to set guidelines for remand could take years, if it ever 
occurs at all.194  The Indiana General Assembly is in a better position to 
                                                 
188 See supra note 183 and accompanying text (articulating the proposed statutory 
language, specifically subsections (c), (h), (i), and (l), which impose thirty or sixty day time 
limitations on attorneys and panelists). 
189 See supra note 183 and accompanying text (including specific statutory language in 
subsection (i) that allows trial judges to only grant one thirty day time extension to the 
Panel). 
190 See supra notes 77–83 and accompanying text (presenting the facts, holding, and 
reasoning of the only Indiana Supreme Court case that directly addresses the issue, Miller). 
191 See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing the substantial length of time the 
Panel process adds to the overall disposition of medical malpractice claims, and that the 
statutory timeframe is never met). 
192 See supra note 183 and accompanying text (providing examples of clear language in 
the proposed statute to ensure strict time limitations on additional Panel review). 
193 See supra Part III.C (evaluating the benefits of a solution stemming from the Indiana 
General Assembly, especially considering the Indiana Supreme Court’s denial of transfer in 
the Chambers case, along with the uncertainty of the “perfect” case coming through the 
judicial system and eventually finding its way to Indiana’s high court). 
194 See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing the unlikelihood of this issue 
arising and the Indiana Supreme Court accepting it in light of the court’s denial of transfer 
of the Chambers case). 
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amend the Act because it can receive input from trial attorneys, the IDOI, 
health care providers, and concerned citizens.195 
In light of the Chambers decision and the implications it will have on 
future medical malpractice cases, it is time that the Indiana General 
Assembly revisits the Panel provision of the Act to eliminate confusion 
and conflicting case law.  Hoping that the Indiana Supreme Court hears 
a case that perfectly addresses all of the issues this Note raises is 
impractical and unrealistic.196  For that reason, the Indiana General 
Assembly is in the best position to provide a remedy to trial judges, 
medical malpractice attorneys, and medical malpractice patients who 
will seek relief under the Act.197 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Currently, the Act and Indiana case law do not permit new evidence 
of additional breaches in the standard of care, discovered in good faith 
after a Panel opinion, to come into evidence under any circumstances.198  
Although Miller v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend and K.D. v. Chambers 
use different reasoning in determining the fate of additional breaches, 
neither decision directly addresses the concerns raised in this Note.199  
These decisions do indicate that the outcome of future cases with similar 
issues could be resolved using the reasoning of either case, but 
predicting how a court will rule is unclear.200  Thus far, courts will likely 
                                                 
195 See Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Reform Revisited, supra note 31, at 1047 (asserting that a 
balance must be struck in order for medical malpractice reform to be successful).  In 
addressing the balance: 
The adoption of tort reform in any field, including malpractice, 
involves the balancing of interests among injured claimants, tortfeasors 
and the insurers that effectively finance the tort claim awards and 
settlement of tortfeasors.  If the balance is struck too far in favor of 
tortfeasors and their insurers, tort claimants have reduced access to fair 
compensation for their injuries.  If the balance is struck too far in favor 
of tort claimants, the ability of tortfeasors and their insurers to finance 
tort claims and settlements is compromised. 
Id.; see also supra note 34 (providing an example of current legislative action in order to 
remedy an issue with the patient’s compensation fund provision in the Act, which reduces 
the payout time from six months to three months). 
196 See supra note 90 and accompanying text (addressing the Indiana Supreme Court’s 
denial of transfer of the Chambers case). 
197 See supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text (discussing the competing roles of the 
Indiana courts and the General Assembly). 
198 See supra Part II.C (explaining Miller and Chambers); supra Part III.A (analyzing the 
rules of law from Miller and Chambers). 
199 See supra notes 82–83 (discussing the reasoning in Miller); supra note 89 (providing the 
reasoning for the court’s decision in Chambers). 
200 See supra Part III.A (distinguishing the outcomes of Miller and Chambers). 
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be split on which precedent to follow when analyzing additional 
breaches.201  If a court views the additional breach as one that was 
expressed in the proposed complaint, clearly or vaguely, the court will 
likely follow Miller and determine whether the breach was articulated 
enough to be considered a separate breach.202  If a court views the 
additional breach as new and separate from the breach, or breaches, 
alleged in the proposed complaint, the court will likely follow Chambers 
and determine that evidence of that separate breach is inadmissible.203 
Through the additional section to chapter ten of the Act proposed in 
Part IV.A, the hypothetical scenario presented in Part I is easily 
resolved.204  Olivia requests a court hearing, and presents evidence of an 
additional breach in the standard of care by Lynniebrook Hospital that 
was not previously presented to the Panel.205  The judge determines the 
evidence was discovered in good faith, and remands the case to the 
Panel that reviewed Olivia’s original submission for further review.206  
The judge instructs the Panel that its inquiry is strictly limited to the new 
evidence and stays the proceedings while the panelists review it.207  Once 
the Panel renders an opinion on whether there was an additional breach 
of the standard of care, the court regains jurisdiction and proceeds with 
adjudication.208  Following the proposed statute, courts will not have to 
decide whether Miller or Chambers is more applicable to each case.209 
If the Indiana General Assembly passes a similar statute to the Panel 
chapter of the Act, the three major problems under the current Act will 
be resolved.210  First, attorneys will be able to honor the ongoing duty to 
update discovery responses until trial, and the statute ensures that a 
                                                 
201 See supra Part III.A (considering the conflicting rules of law produced by Miller and 
Chambers). 
202 See supra notes 77–83 (reviewing Miller). 
203 See supra notes 84–90 (discussing Chambers). 
204 See supra Part IV (proposing an additional section to chapter ten of the Act as a 
legislative remedy to the issue created by Chambers); supra Part I (providing a hypothetical 
scenario that highlights the implications of Chambers). 
205 See supra Part I (providing a hypothetical scenario that highlights the implications of 
Chambers); supra Part IV (proposing a method by which the problem presented in the 
hypothetical scenario can be resolved by the trial judge). 
206 See supra Part I (providing a hypothetical scenario); supra Part IV.A (resolving the 
issue raised in the scenario through the proposed statute). 
207 See supra Part IV.B (arguing that the proposed statute provides clear guidelines to trial 
judges). 
208 See supra Part IV.B (asserting that the proposed statute allows the trial court to retain 
limited jurisdiction during the additional Panel review to ensure the process is timely). 
209 See supra Part II.A (discussing the conflicting decisions in Miller and Chambers). 
210 See supra Part III (explaining the implications of the current law); supra Part IV.B 
(addressing the concerns of each through the proposed statute). 
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Panel may review newly discovered evidence.211  Second, plaintiffs will 
be afforded the opportunity to litigate based on an additional breach, 
even after a Panel reviews the evidence of the additional breach.212  
Finally, Indiana courts will have concrete statutory language to follow, 
which will resolve any inconsistency in case law.213  Without legislative 
action from the Indiana General Assembly, the “big fish” defendants, 
like Lynniebrook Hospital in the hypothetical, will continue to be off the 
hook for injuries caused by its employees if the relevant evidence is 
buried deep enough that it cannot be discovered before a Panel renders 
an opinion.214 
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211 See supra Part II.D (explaining the ongoing duty rule and the duties of the Panel). 
212 See supra Part IV.B (explaining how the proposed statute will ensure parties can fully 
litigate all claims of breaches in the standard of care by health care providers). 
213 See supra Part III.A (analyzing the opposite holdings in Miller and Chambers due to 
varying judicial interpretation of the statutes and case law). 
214 See supra Part I (posing a hypothetical scenario to be resolved by the statutory section 
proposed in Part IV.A); supra Part IV.B (addressing the future implications to medical 
malpractice cases if the Indiana General Assembly does not adopt a new statute addressing 
the problematic case law created by Chambers). 
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